BearCaution

ZNOG Zion Oil & Gas Update – Video of Well Interview

Video footage of wells – Worker says there isn’t oil there at MJ #1 Well Chairman of Corporate Governance Committee Resigns. Running out of Cash within the next 2 months.

SSTI ShotSpotter (SSTI) – Court Case Exposes Failures of ShotSpotter Technology

We are short ShotSpotter because: The Simmons case alleges unreliable data & forensic reports that can be modified after the fact. ShotSpotter’s accuracy percentage is a product of their marketing department, not their data scientists. ShotSpotter’s technology & testimony has been deemed inadmissible in certain courts in 2 of its major markets (CA & NY). ShotSpotter has made no known efforts to get independent confirmation of the validity of their data for court use. ShotSpotter requires human analysis to prevent false positives that their software generates. We believe 9.5x EV/Sales is an unsustainable valuation for this unprofitable company.

BDSI BDSI – Money Losing Opioid Company Founded By The Bankruptcy Experts

We are short BioDelivery Sciences International (BDSI), a money losing opioid manufacturer that is connected to Dr. Frank O’Donnell, Jonnie Williams’ long-time business partner. Dr. Frank O’Donnell and Jonnie Williams are business partners whose companies have a 30-year history of stock wipeouts, SEC investigations, shareholder lawsuits, and even bribery of a governor. BDSI engages in questionable business practices similar to Insys & Purdue Pharma – co-pay cards for free opioids; paying suspect doctors; and convincing doctors to increase dosage. However BDSI is different from other opioid companies in that they burn through cash hand over fist. Over $6.5m of negative Free Cash Flow from Operations per quarter! 10-K disclosure around the Teva settlement shows that a generic Belbuca could be coming much sooner than management has indicated.

XXII 22nd Century Group – Key Patents have Expired!

Fuzzy Panda Research is Short XXII since we discovered that the most important patents in XXII’s patent portfolio have now expired. XXII’s Key QPT patents behind the tobacco used in their MRTP & PMTA applications expired in 2018. QPT expired patents are the essential patents behind the Vector 21-41 tobacco strain. Patent Expiration explains why BAT was not willing to pay $3 million to have an exclusive license. Big Tobacco companies already have a plethora of low-nicotine tobacco patents and can adhere to FDA low-nicotine standards and now they can produce a similar plant to XXII’s Vector 21-41 tobacco strain. Lawsuit accusing XXII, CEO Henry Sicignano, and Trey Prevost (a felon) of stealing and copying the intellectual property of Global Tobacco LLC.

WKHS Workhorse Group Inc (WKHS) – Short – Critical Failures in USPS NGDV Bid Revealed

A few weeks ago, Hindenburg Research exposed Nikola, a high-flying EV company, as an alleged “intricate fraud”. The stock fell over 50% in the process. Nikola has since admitted to purposely rolling a truck down a hill to mask the appearance of a working prototype for a promo video... Workhorse rolled a USPS prototype truck down a hill accidently1 after their parking brake failed causing a union USPS driver to be hospitalized after jumping out of the runaway vehicle. We think this debacle as well as the numerous other “critical failures” we will lay out, destroyed Workhorse’s chances of ever landing the USPS NGDV award.

FRSX Foresight Autonomous (FRSX): A Minefield of Criminals, Self-dealing, Fake Sales, and Old Technology

We are Short Foresight Autonomous (FRSX) and see material downside and expect this reverse-merger penny-stock promotion to collapse back to below $1 for the following reasons: FRSX’s cap table is littered with accused & convicted criminals. Insider Enrichment via egregious related party “service agreements” which allow FSRX’s CEO and the known penny stock promoters to siphon cash out of the company. Founding shareholders, members of the Board of Directors, and FRSX’s CFO have been involved in at least ten other stock promotion schemes. Insiders got paid but shareholders got fleeced. FRSX is a family affair. The new CTO is actually the CEO’s Brother-In-Law. The CEO’s daughter, is their legal advisor and VP of HR. His daughter has also received generous share grants including free extensions of expiring options despite being a part-time employee.

ELMS ELMS – EV Pretender – Passing Off Chinese Imports as “Made in the USA”; Booking Fake Revenue of Fully Returnable Products?

We are short ELMS because we think they have taken misleading statements to investors to a different level and gone beyond just exaggerating the size of their order book. ELMS DO NOT even BUILD their own EVs Import Records show ELMS is importing fully assembled Chinese vehicles and trying to pass them off as “Made in the USA.” Secure order book and revenue is actually returnable! ELMS’s major “customer” is Randy Marion Automotive – Contracts show that Randy Marion has the right to RETURN all the vehicles purchased from ELMS. We think ELMS has potentially been questionably booking revenue. Overpaid for an idled factory – capital from their SPAC IPO was used to buy a factory that had been idled and was about to be written down. Purchased from the company ELMS recently fired CEO used to run at a >60% premium. Factory Visits = Empty Parking Lots + Chinese Vehicles with ELMS “logo added”.

EVGO EVGO – A Broken “ESG” Company Connected to Jeffrey Epstein

EVGO is a mediocre EV charging company that we believe is substantially overvalued. Not only are a significant number of their EV chargers broken, but they also have triple digit negative operating profit margins which have gotten even worse. UC Berkeley study reveals 25.5% of EVGO’s chargers are broken/out of service. Operating margins declined from -199% in 2019 to -260% in 2021 and -381% in Q1-22 Charger utilization has DECLINED by 21% from 2019 to 2021. Key patent was recently denied in May 2022. EVGO only spends $2m a year on R&D Questionable partnerships – including with ELMS who recently filed for bankruptcy.

EROS Eros: New Receivables Accounting Red Flags

Today we intend to provide support for longstanding questions posed by short sellers relating to Eros’s potentially misleading accounts receivables. Eros has consistently maintained a large uncollected accounts receivables balance which has indicated at the very least that the company has unusual difficulty in collecting its revenue. At worst, the balance could be indicative of illegitimate revenue transactions or ‘round tripping,’ a means of boosting the operating metrics of a company without ultimately providing any real economic benefit.

PGLC PolarityTE: Investors Beware

We believe PolarityTE is merely the latest iteration in a series of failed story stocks, and that common shareholders are exposed to severe risks.

OPK OPKO Health: A House Of Cards Tumbling In The Dark

Opko has dropped approximately 25% since its recent quarterly report issued last Wednesday after it missed estimates on both revenue and earnings. In addition to the continued disappointing sales in the company’s FDA-approved product Rayaldee, the diagnostics division also saw a significant drop in revenue. We believe the recent quarter is merely the beginning of a series of continuing problems at the company.

RIOT Riot Blockchain: Sudden Business Pivot, Suspicious Acquisitions, Questionable Special Dividend

-Riot made a dramatic pivot from a “life science tools” business to a blockchain company mere months ago. -The company paid approximately $12 million for a two-week-old crypo-mining entity that owned only about $1.9 million in crypto mining assets. A second acquisition raises additional red flags. -Riot depleted an estimated 63% of company cash through a special dividend that appears to have disproportionately advantaged insiders. -Regardless of one’s views on blockchain technology, we believe Riot is a name that should be avoided.

MARA Marathon Patent Group: Bright Red Flags With This Newfangled ‘Blockchain’ Play

Marathon recently announced an agreement for the acquisition of Global Bit Ventures Inc. that will leave prior common shareholders with just 19% of the company. GBV was an entity set up only in August of this year and appears to have an undisclosed security interest with the former CFO, EVP and Secretary of Marathon. Marathon has multiple concerning parallels to Riot Blockchain, which recently engineered a similarly dubious pivot to the “blockchain.” BDO resigned as auditor November 27. Per the filing “the resignation of BDO was not recommended by the Company’s audit committee.” We are urging strong caution to investors in Marathon regardless of one’s views on blockchain technology.

CSSE Chicken Soup For the Soul Entertainment Is A Toxic Mess

A charity that the CEO advises accounted for approximately 46% of 2016 revenue and 95% of 2015 revenue through “sponsorship” of the public entity’s television programs. The charity was created in 2015, mere months after the creation of CSSE itself. The company later “donated” shares back to the charity. We have concerns about this relationship. The company reported a change in accounting methodology the day of an announced acquisition, positioning it to record a dubious $22.2 million paper “gain on bargain purchase” from the deal. CSSE is bizarrely structured as a subsidiary of a subsidiary and pays numerous fees to its affiliates. Public investors receive no proceeds from the popular book series. The CEO of CSSE was formerly CEO of Winstar, a public company that declared bankruptcy amidst allegations of revenue falsification and accounting improprieties.

CRIUF Crius Energy Trust: An Unsustainable Collision Course

Crius’s non-IFRS “Payout Ratio” includes multiple questionable adjustments which have given investors a false sense of security. We think Crius is on the precipice of failure. Crius is liquidity constrained with only $24.3m in cash as of September 30th. A new preliminary legal settlement of up to $18.5m will deplete much of its remaining cash. Credit lines are similarly stretched. Crius had $104.6m of debt as of quarter-end with current estimated remaining available credit of only $25.2m. The Company is borrowing at rates as high as 9.5% while paying out dividends at ~9.3%. Current dividend payout rates imply an unrealistic C$47.7m annual payout. Crius’s early backers and potentially current key holders include individuals affiliated with hedge fund Platinum Partners, whose executives were indicted for operating “like a Ponzi Scheme,” according to federal prosecutors.

APHA Could Rampant Red Flags Drown Aphria’s Proposed Nuuvera Acquisition?

We see multiple red flags with Aphria’s proposed purchase of Nuuvera, a company that was incorporated in January ’17 and had revenue of only ~$30k from inception to September ’17. The self-described “architect” of the Aphria/Nuuvera deal, Andy DeFrancesco, has a questionable history, including close links to controversial financiers such as Barry Honig. Despite being a supposed Aphria advisor, a document dated less than a week prior to Nuuvera’s creation shows DeFrancesco took a loan from Nuuvera’s Chairman & largest shareholder. Nuuvera appears to have few substantive assets and has been heavily promoted, including announcements such as a “blockchain” partnership with a company run by one of its own directors. We believe the Nuuvera acquisition would represent a near total destruction of Aphria value. Furthermore, we believe the deal raises questions about Aphria’s aggressive deal-making spree in general.

PLSE Pulse Biosciences: Failed FDA Clearance, New SEC Investigation, And An Uncertain Path Forward

Pulse failed to achieve an FDA 510(k) clearance which it had previously described as a “foundation for future clearances”. The current direction of the company seems highly uncertain. The company and several directors have been subpoenaed as part a newly disclosed SEC investigation into potential insider trading around a company news release. Any future avenues are likely to be capital-intensive. Per the 10-K, “…we plan to raise additional capital in the future”. Bottom line: Pulse is focused on a technology that doesn’t seem to work well. Limited oncological studies show poor to mixed results. Aesthetic applications thus far have insignificant potential. We think Pulse is stuck in a precarious position, and the current stock price in no way reflects the risks, capital needs, and the looming regulatory overhang facing the company.

INPX Inpixon: If This Sketchy Deal Is Legal The Public Markets May Be In Deep Trouble

During the height of “blockchain mania” Inpixon issued a press release announcing that it would leverage the blockchain. The price and volume predictably surged on the news. The company shared the press release with multiple investors in advance. The investors bought substantial stakes and then exited their positions into the spike that followed the news release. The stock has dropped about 95% in the ensuing months, eviscerating many who bought into the announcement. The kicker: The whole scenario may be entirely legal due to a nuance with how the information was shared.

GNPX We Believe Genprex Is A Disaster In The Making

Genprex was founded by a team that led Introgen, one of the more notable biotech catastrophes that declared bankruptcy amidst allegations of repeatedly misleading investors. Genprex’s product candidate is based on IP that was abandoned in Introgen’s bankruptcy because it “provide[d] no value to the debtors and [was] of no interest to the potential purchasers”. The product candidate looks to already be in trouble. The company’s Phase II trial has been suspended since April 2016. Genprex’s underwriter, Network 1 Financial, has led or participated in the underwritings of recent disasters such as LongFin, Long Blockchain, Adomani, and CIFS among others. Texas-based Genprex uses a small Boca Raton, Florida-based auditor and has been heavily promoted on penny stock websites and newsletters. We believe Genprex is a zero in the making.

AMEH Apollo Medical: Look Out Below – Russell’s Latest Float Calculation Screw-Up

FTSE/Russell recently added ApolloMed to its indices but erred in its calculation of float, forcing index funds to buy a disproportionate number of shares; roughly one-third of the actual float. The error and subsequent forced index buying caused shares to spike 50% on 114x normal volume on the day prior to index inclusion. Russell realized its mistake and has slated a reduction of ApolloMed’s index shares by ~86.5% for 9/21, which should force the sale of roughly 1.7 million shares. With an average daily volume of only 130,000 shares per day, we expect the forced sales to crush the stock by the effective date. ApolloMed has complex financials due to several consolidated VIEs. After untangling the web, we believe fair value is $5.80/share, suggesting a ~60% downside scenario on a fundamental basis alone.

LTS Ladenburg: Near-Term Headwinds And Unsustainable Balance Sheet Engineering

The SEC recently leveled allegations of securities fraud against Ladenburg’s Chairman and largest holder, Phil Frost, who owns ~34% of Ladenburg’s common equity. The company was struggling before the recent news. Ladenburg has regularly generated net losses to common holders and its balance sheet has become increasingly leveraged. When factoring in Ladenburg’s preferred stock – with a liquidation claim of $425 million ahead of the common – the balance sheet is already in deeply negative equity territory for common holders. Ladenburg has been issuing more debt and more preferred stock to pay out hefty dividends and to support common stock buybacks. This dynamic never ends well. The controversy is likely to lead to further fundamental deterioration; financial firms are sensitive to reputational risks. Plus, the worst may not be over; signs point toward possible criminal charges.

GNW Genworth: We See Almost No Chance Of Regulatory Approval. This Deal Would Be A Disaster For Policyholders

Genworth’s proposed acquirer, China Oceanwide, looks to be in the midst of a deep liquidity crunch. Following multiple FOIA requests, we were able to locate audits for the opaque Chinese conglomerate that show consistently negative cash flow and debt levels spiking to clearly unsustainable levels. We see almost no chance of regulators approving this deal. Doing so would hand control of Genworth’s assets to a faltering entity in a jurisdiction with limited recourse. A deep dive into Genworth’s insurance carriers show that the company looks starkly under-reserved. Our analysis indicates that Genworth’s LTC exposure is under-reserved by at least $9.9 billion. Overall we see this deal failing followed by an unwinding of Genworth. We’ve taken a significant short position in Genworth’s equity.

YRIV Yangtze River Port & Logistics: Total Zero. On-the-Ground Research Shows Assets Appear to be Largely Fabricated

We are of the strong opinion that Yangtze River Port & Logistics is a scheme run by its Chairman & controlling shareholder to siphon money away from U.S. public markets. Based on our findings we think YRIV is a total zero.

SKYS Sky Solar: Court Records Show That Lender Already Withdrew Buyout Proposal But Retail Investors Don’t Seem To Realize It Yet

The company’s financial state was weak prior to the new $121m liability and the recent note default. SKYS has had 3 CFOs within the span of 6 months. We expect the stock to dive as retail investors realize what’s actually going on. SKYS looks to be approaching insolvency and we do not anticipate the equity will survive.

PRED Predictive Technology: 95%+ Downside on CEO and Former Chairman’s Past Securities Fraud Allegations, Acquisitions That Reek of Insider Self-Dealing and Dubious “Miracle Cure” Sales Tactics

We believe there is 80% downside to Predictive’s shares purely on valuation alone and 95%+ downside given the issues we have uncovered.

DVA DaVita is Secretly Trying to Defend its Charity Scheme with a Lobbying Scheme

We believe DaVita to be a corrupt healthcare organization whose historical success has relied largely on gouging the healthcare system.

BE Bloom Energy: A “Clean” Energy Darling Wilting to its Demise

We believe that Bloom Energy, once touted as the prospective “holy grail” of clean energy, is instead likely to wind up in the history books alongside failed companies like Theranos or Solyndra. Contrary to myths about Bloom, our research indicates that Bloom’s technology is not sustainable, clean, green, or remotely profitable. We uncovered an estimated $2.2 billion in undisclosed servicing liabilities that the market has missed, even in its most recent re-valuation of Bloom shares. These issues have already begun to surface and we expect they will accelerate. Bloom’s tricky accounting allows it to mask servicing costs and shift write-downs to other periods, thereby avoiding recognizing major recent additional losses. We believe that large debt maturities in 2020 and 2021, amounting to nearly $520 million, make Bloom Energy an obvious bankruptcy candidate.

SDC SmileDirectClub: Moving Fast and Breaking Things in People’s Mouths – 85% Downside

We believe SmileDirectClub will wind up as a case study in why it’s a bad idea to invest in a company that attempts to fit a complex, dangerous medical process onto a low-cost, high volume assembly line. We see downside of 70% purely on a valuation basis, and downside of 85% given the above headwinds. We have a one-year price target of $2.

OPRA Opera: Phantom of the Turnaround – 70% Downside

We think Opera collapses on its own worsening financials, with that timeline accelerating significantly if Google bans its lending apps or if its Chairman/CEO continues to draw cash out of the business through questionable related-party deals.

NEXCF NexTech AR: Relentless Stock Promotion, Sketchy Related Party Transactions and a Vaporware Product—Price Target: $0

We identified multiple brazen related party transactions, including one where the CEO and COO acquired a business personally, only to turn around and sell it to the public company months later, likely netting millions at the expense of shareholders. The company has a significant share lockup coming due next month from a recent toxic financing and has displayed multiple other red flags, such as recent CFO and COO departures. We think NexTech has been thoroughly “pumped”. We now expect a “dump”. We believe its equity is worthless.

PCLO PharmaCielo: 100% Downside on Co-Founder’s History of Securities Fraud Allegations, Numerous Undisclosed Related Party Transactions and Operational Failures

PharmaCielo has property, greenhouses, licenses, and some residual cash. But with essentially no revenue, continued cash burn, and management’s track record of self-enrichment and the co-founder/former CEO’s history of securities fraud charges, we believe PharmaCielo ends up as a total loss for investors.

HFFG HF Foods: 90%+ Downside on Massive Undisclosed Related-Party Transactions, Shareholder Cash Spent on Exotic Supercars & Outrageous Fundamental Valuation

We believe HF and its insiders are masking the true number of shares held by its affiliates. Once made clear to FTSE/Russell, we expect the recent forced index buying in HF will reverse and become forced selling. We see 90%+ downside for HF’s shares based on outrageously priced fundamentals, insider deals that appear to be hollowing out the company, and potential forced selling by FTSE/Russell.

WORX SCWorx: Evidence Points to its Massive COVID-19 Test Deal Being Completely Bogus, Price Target Back to $2.25 Or Lower

We believe the Covid-19 hype surrounding SCWorx is completely bogus and we predict shares will soon return to the $2.25 price level they were at prior to the hype. We also think shares risk being halted and ultimately could move far lower than $2.25 if/when regulators investigate the company’s potentially nefarious business practices at a time when our country and its citizens are arguably at their most vulnerable. We’re offended by how egregious this appears, not only as investors, but as Americans.

NEWP New Pacific Metals: Bolivia Looks Friendly Until A Coup Forces Your Friends to Flee to Mexico– 90%+ Downside

Our base case is that New Pacific has its concessions and agreements with the state revoked entirely or negotiated on far less favorable terms. Even if the company retains its concessions (which we don’t think it will) New Pacific shares trade at vastly inflated levels, representing 85% downside on a purely fundamental basis. All told, we see 90%+ downside for shares of New Pacific and 25%-45% downside for shares of related Silvercorp, which owns almost a 29% stake in the company.

1636 China Metal Resources Utilization: 100% Downside to This Zombie Company

We believe that China Metal Resources Utilization (“CMRU”) is nothing more than a ‘zombie company’; an entity technically alive, but under such severe financial distress and laden with so many red flags, that insolvency seems inevitable. We believe CMRU’s Chairman/CEO may have reached the same conclusion: he has disclosed agreements indicating his intention to offload his entire personal stake in the company, which currently represents about 29.65% of the company’s outstanding shares.

SRNE Sorrento’s Pandemic Profiteering: Experts and Former Employees Speak Out on Sensational Claims of Covid-19 Cure

We see significant downside from these levels and believe the company is already in the process of severely diluting its new unsuspecting investor base. We believe regulators should closely scrutinize the company’s actions over the last several weeks.

GNUS A Bagholder’s Guide to Why We Think Genius Brands Will Be a $1.50 Stock Within a Month

Stock runs are always fueled by exciting stories, but the ending is almost always written in the boring fine print. We think Genius Brands will crash spectacularly due to obvious market mechanics that its retail investor base are likely unfamiliar with – even in the frothiest of markets.

WINS Losing With WINS: NASDAQ’s Latest Disgrace Has No Financials, An Insolvent Parent Entity and Is Embroiled in What Appears to Be an Obvious Pump and Dump

Wins has a history of alleged stock manipulation, including a mysterious 4,555% spike in 2017 that gave the firm a temporary $9 billion market cap. That circus led to the company’s ejection from the Russell index, a shareholder lawsuit and a NASDAQ delisting threat. Wins strikes us as a company worth $0 trading at a current market cap of $700 million ($34 price as of this writing) due to its recent irregular trading spike. Frankly, we think the company is in the midst of one last pump and dump before it disappears for good. In our view, Wins never should have remained listed after its first fiasco in 2017. We encourage NASDAQ to implement stronger policies that prevent companies that repeatedly exhibit glaring red flags from trading on a premier national exchange.

IDEX Ideanomics Walks Back 1m Sq Ft Claims Today; Our Visit To IDEX’s “MEG” Facility Shows Zero Company Presence

In short, we think the company has fabricated its supposed sales center, and altered images in its press releases to make it seem that it operates the facility. We continue to believe, as we stated yesterday, that the company is engaged in flagrant securities fraud and that it’s stock will wind up in the pennies or halted by regulators.

JCOM J2 Global: Troubling Related Party Transactions, Looming Impairments And A Suspicious History Of Insider Enrichment Spanning Decades

COVID-19 has now officially halted the company’s acquisition model. We feel this is a crucial opportunity for the company’s auditors to examine all of the transactions we lay out in this report (including all acquisitions made under the former VP of Corporate Development) and take necessary measures to prevent what we believe to be additional misuse of shareholder capital going forward.

FD Facedrive: A $1.4b ESG Stock Promotion with a Hollow Core Business, Flailing Business Pivots and Multi-Million Dollar Payments to an Opaque BVI Entity; 95% Downside

We believe this “story” stock is heading toward a hard repricing, as we see de minimis overall value in the company’s operations. Our 1-year price target is CAD $0.70, representing 95% downside

GRWG GrowGeneration: This Latest Euphoric Retail Stock Has The Brightest Management Red Flags We’ve Ever Seen—70%+ Downside

Purely on a fundamental/valuation basis, without the alarming warning signs above, we see 60% downside to shares of the company. The company trades at an extremely rich 60.5x adjusted estimated 2020 EBITDA and over 6.1x estimated 2020 sales. Management seems to agree with our valuation assessment. The company completed a financing at $5.60 per share, reflecting a 70% discount to current levels. Insiders and key holders, including the CEO, President & Co-Founder, and private equity backers have sold stock aggressively this year in the $4-$8 range.

NKLA Nikola: How to Parlay An Ocean of Lies Into a Partnership With the Largest Auto OEM in America

We think Trevor Milton, through dozens of outright lies, was able to form partnerships with some of the largest legacy auto companies in the world in their desperation to catch up to Tesla’s EV leadership status. Trevor has ensured he is not going down with the ship. He cashed out $70 million around the IPO and amended his share lock-up from 1-year to 180 days. If he is fired, his equity awards immediately vest and he is entitled to collect $20 million over two years. Milton has laid the groundwork to extract hundreds of millions from Nikola years before ever delivering on his promises. Every now and then a story comes around that exposes how little the “experts” really know. Theranos inked partnerships with Walgreens, Safeway, and Cleveland Clinic and staffed its board with luminaries. We think Nikola’s partners did not do their homework.

KNDI Kandi: How This China-Based NASDAQ-Listed Company Used Fake Sales, EV Hype to Nab $160 Million From U.S. Investors

Today we reveal what we believe to be a brazen scheme by China-based, NASDAQ-listed Kandi Technologies Group to falsify revenue using fake sales to undisclosed affiliates. Our investigation included extensive on-the-ground inspection at Kandi’s factories and customer locations in China, interviews with over a dozen former employees and business partners, and review of numerous litigation documents and international public records. We unmasked Kandi’s “unnamed” top customers and found that almost 64% of Kandi’s last twelve months (LTM) sales have been to undisclosed related parties.

LOOP Loop’s “Independent Review” Of Its Technology Falls Flat

Our original report asked management 15 questions, ranging from why Loop’s initial funding was facilitated through a convicted stock felon to why the company’s two top scientists were in their 20s with no post-graduate education in sciences. Those questions all remain unanswered. It appears the market may have already started to figure out what we reveal in this report, as Loop stock has fallen precipitously since the company released the “independent review”. We remain short Loop’s stock with a price target of $0 and continue to strongly believe that Loop’s claimed technological advancements do not exist.

CLOV Clover Health: How the “King of SPACs” Lured Retail Investors Into a Broken Business Facing an Active, Undisclosed DOJ Investigation

Today, we reveal how Clover Health and its Wall Street celebrity promoter, Chamath Palihapitiya, misled investors about critical aspects of Clover’s business in the run-up to the company’s SPAC go-public transaction last month. Our investigation into Clover Health has spanned almost 4 months and has included more than a dozen interviews with former employees, competitors, and industry experts, dozens of calls to doctor’s offices, and a review of thousands of pages of government reports, insurance filings, regulatory filings, and company marketing materials.

ORA Ormat: Dirty Dealings in ‘Clean’ Energy

Ormat’s Honduran plant operates in Copan, known as drug cartel territory. A Honduran congressman told us “You can’t operate in Copan without paying the cartels, the gangs or corrupt politicians – and sometimes all three.” We found that Ormat’s contractor in Honduras was raided by authorities on suspicion of being a front company for drug cartels. Its owners are in jail awaiting trial. Ormat’s culture of corruption isn’t limited to international markets. In the U.S., Ormat settled DoJ fraud charges after whistleblowers alleged it made fraudulent misrepresentations in order to secure government clean energy loans. Corruption is a double edged-sword. Just as a company can win lucrative contracts through illicit means, those contracts can be pulled away once exposed. We expect a very bumpy road ahead for Ormat.

RIDE The Lordstown Motors Mirage: Fake Orders, Undisclosed Production Hurdles, And A Prototype Inferno

In January 2021, Lordstown’s first street road test resulted in the vehicle bursting into flames 10 minutes into the test drive. We share copies of the 911 call and a police report we received through FOIA requests. Lordstown only went public in October 2020, but in that brief time, executives and directors have unloaded ~$28 million in stock. We think it bodes poorly when executives unload stock in a company with no actual product that claims to be on the cusp of mass-production. We think investors, workers, and the local community deserve much more transparency on what is going on at Lordstown. We ask 21 questions at the end of our piece that we think the company should answer.

EBON Ebang: Yet Another Crypto “China Hustle” Absconding With U.S. Investor Cash

Ebang is a China-based crypto company that has raised ~$374 million from U.S. investors in 4 offerings since going public in June 2020. While the company represented that it would use the majority of its numerous capital proceeds to develop its business operations, our research discovered it instead directed much of the cash out of the company through a series of opaque deals with insiders and questionable counterparties.

PCYO PureCycle: The Latest Zero-Revenue ESG SPAC Charade, Sponsored By The Worst Of Wall Street

In our opinion, PureCycle represents the worst qualities of the SPAC boom; another quintessential example of how executives and SPAC sponsors enrich themselves while hoisting unproven technology and ridiculous financial projections onto the public markets, leaving retail investors to face the ultimate consequences.

HMBL HUMBL: Illusions of Grandeur, Collapsing International Deals, And Lurking Dilution

HUMBL is an early-stage fintech company with a $5.6 billion fully diluted market cap that recently reverse-merged onto the OTC. It ended its most recent quarter with ~$156,000 in revenue and currently has ~$4.5 million in cash. It had zero revenue in 2020. The company aspires to be an Amazon or Alipay, imagining that it will facilitate payments to billions of people around the world by transcending borders and lowering costs using blockchain technology. Our research shows the company has failed to deliver on even the most basic aspects of its business plan, including features it claimed were completed months ago. Six months after going public, its users can’t send or receive money on its “payment” app, let alone engage in low cost, cross-border crypto currency transactions.

DKNG DraftKings: A $21 Billion SPAC Betting It Can Hide Its Black Market Operations

We think DraftKings has systematically skirted the law and taken elaborate steps to obfuscate its black market operations. These violations appear to be continuing to this day, all while insiders aggressively cash out amidst the market froth.

TGLS Tecnoglass: Cocaine Cartel Connections, Undisclosed Family Deals, And Accounting Irregularities All In One Nasdaq SPAC

Tecnoglass is a Colombia-based producer of glass for residential and commercial buildings founded in 1984 by two brothers, Jose Daes and Christian Daes, who currently both serve as directors and CEO & COO, respectively. The stock has surged ~390% this year on record results fueled by a pandemic real estate boom in Florida, the company’s key market. Recently, U.S. census data shows that new residential building permits have peaked, signaling a fundamental headwind going forward.

SLI Standard Lithium: All The Hallmarks of A Made-In-Vancouver Stock Promotion Scheme Fueled By EV Lithium Hype

Standard Lithium is a zero-revenue mining company that uplisted to the NYSE in July 2021 with a fantastic-sounding story of being a first mover in direct-lithium-extraction (DLE), a technology that aims to revolutionize lithium mining. Standard’s CEO Robert Mintak has been involved with at least 9 publicly traded companies. On average, shares of these companies have fallen ~97%. Of the 9 companies, 5 have been delisted, several have faced regulatory scrutiny, none operate profitably, and at least 8 used paid stock promotion.

NTRA Natera: Pioneers In Deceptive Medical Billing

Natera has employed a dizzying array of billing deceptions to fuel sales growth. Despite it all, the company is starkly unprofitable. We expect its “growth” and prospects will rapidly fizzle as payors and patients wise up to its practices.

N/A J&J Purchasing: When It Sounds Too Good To Be True

This firm, J&J Purchasing, has pitched potential clients on an investment offering 50% annualized returns with virtually zero risk. It claimed, at one point, to have raised $400 million from over 1,000 investors since 2016. Through the course of our research, we submitted our findings to regulators through the SEC’s tip program. We recently also shared our work with reporters at the Wall Street Journal. Our work has included in-house research, extensive document review, as well as in-person meetings and recorded correspondence with the firm’s principals and marketers under the guise of becoming a potential client.

MULN Mullen Automotive: Yet Another Fast Talking EV Hustle

Mullen’s Founder, Chairman and CEO, David Michery led 5 failed penny stock companies prior to Mullen. Two had their securities registrations revoked by the SEC, two terminated their securities registrations, and the last one merged with a speculative gold mining company. Michery merged one of his prior entities as part of a 3-way deal with an individual who was later charged with criminal securities fraud and sentenced to 30 years in prison. Prosecutors alleged that the merger deal involving Michery’s prior company was part of the scheme. Michery lists no educational background in his Mullen biography. Contrary to other top electric vehicle executives that have engineering and manufacturing backgrounds, Michery’s past work experience was largely in the entertainment industry.

SGLY Singularity Future Technology: This Nasdaq-Listed Company’s CEO Is A Fugitive, On The Run For Allegedly Operating A Massive Ponzi Scheme

In April 2022, Singularity announced an up to $250 million partnership with a 10 GW+ capacity U.S. power producer called Golden Mainland. Golden Mainland’s website was registered just 1 day before the Singularity press release, and the entity was incorporated just 6 months earlier. We found no indication that the prospective partner owned any energy assets, much less 10 GW+ worth. We also found no evidence that Golden Mainland has a headquarters or any employees aside from its founder, who used a Gmail address on the SEC filing detailing the supposed $250 million deal. We believe Golden Mainland is a blatant fabrication. We think Singularity is an extremely obvious total scam, with little to no actual business operations. Given that CEO Yang Jie helped usher in the implosion of another Nasdaq-listed company (China Commercial Credit), along with a massive Ponzi scheme in China, we expect he will continue until he is stopped. We have shared our findings with Nasdaq and authorities.

TWTR Musk Holds All The Cards: We See a Significant Risk That The Twitter Deal Gets Repriced Lower

As a result of these developments, we believe that if Elon Musk’s bid for Twitter disappeared tomorrow, Twitter’s equity would fall by 50% from current levels. Consequently, we see a significant risk that the deal gets repriced lower

ENOB Miracle Cures and Murder For Hire: How A Spoon-Bending Turkish Magician Built A $600 Million Nasdaq-Listed Scam Based On A Lifetime Of Lies

We think Gumrukcu is a lifelong con artist, who has catapulted himself from being a small-town Turkish magician to leading a publicly-traded, Nasdaq-listed medical research enterprise and fooling many along the way. With its founder and main source of scientific discoveries jailed on murder-for-hire allegations, this cash-burning company without peer-reviewed research and no genuine clinical prospects is now a “catch me if you can” story that we believe has finally reached the end-phase.

ITP Muddy Waters Initiating Coverage on ONP – Strong Sell

We are confident that ONP is a fraud. Its purpose is to raise and misappropriate tens of millions of dollars. Approximately $30 million has been misappropriated since October 2009. ONP overstated 2008 revenue by 27x. ONP overstated 2009 revenue by 40x. ONP’s claims about its top 10 customers support our fraud conclusion. ONP overvalues its assets by at least 10x. The value of ONP’s Production Lines is greatly overstated. ONP’s inventory is overstated by millions of dollars. ONP’s claim of inventory turnover of 32.5x and 16.8x in 2008 and 2009 (respectively) are without credibility when compared to those of China’s industry leaders, which range from 4.3x to 7.7x. ONP overstates its gross profit margin by hundreds of basis points.

RINO Muddy Waters initiating coverage on RINO – Strong Sell

Muddy Waters LLC has initiated coverage on RINO International Corp. (RINO) with a Strong Sell rating and a $2.45 price target. RINO claims to be the leader in selling desulfurization (“FGD”) and other environmental equipment to Chinese steel mills. It reported 2009 revenue of $193 million. In reality its revenue is under $15 million, and its management has diverted tens of millions of dollars for its own use. We value RINO based on the cash we believe remains in the company after the most recent raise.

CCME Muddy Waters Initiating Coverage on CCME – Strong Sell

Muddy Waters LLC has initiated coverage on China MediaExpress Holdings, Inc. (CCME) with a Strong Sell rating and an estimated value of $5.28.

DGW Muddy Waters Initiating Coverage on DGW – Strong Sell

Muddy Waters LLC has initiated coverage on Duoyuan Global Water Inc. (DGW) with a Strong Sell rating and an estimated value of less than $1.00.

TRE Muddy Waters LLC has initiated coverage on Sino-Forest Corporation (TRE.TO, OTC:SNOFF) with a Strong Sell rating and an estimated value of < $1.00.

Muddy Waters LLC has initiated coverage on Sino-Forest Corporation (TRE.TO, OTC:SNOFF) with a Strong Sell rating and an estimated value of < $1.00.

SPRD Open Letter to SPRD Chairman re: MW Concerns

Muddy Waters, LLC has begun researching Spreadtrum, Communications Inc. (NASDAQ: SPRD), and we have taken a short position in it. (Please see our disclaimer below.) We have identified a number of issues in SPRD’s filings, and we believe that there is a high risk of material misstatement in the reported financials. Our concerns are gravest regarding 2010 and 2011 numbers.

FMCN Muddy Waters Initiating Coverage on FMCN – Strong Sell

Muddy Waters rates Focus Media Holding Ltd. (NASDAQ: FMCN) shares a Strong Sell because of significant overstatement of the number of screens in its LCD network and its Olympus-style acquisition overpayments. The $1.1 billion in write-downs from its acquisitions exceed one-third of FMCN’s enterprise value, making FMCN’s acquisitive behavior more destructive than Olympus’s to shareholder value. FMCN insiders have sold at least $1.7 billion worth of stock (two-thirds of FMCN’s enterprise value) since FMCN’s IPO. At the same time, the insiders and their business associates further enrich themselves by trading in FMCN assets, while costing FMCN shareholders substantial sums of money.

EDU Initiating Coverage on EDU – Strong Sell

Muddy Waters rates New Oriental Education & Technology Group (NYSE: EDU) shares a Strong Sell because it is probable that EDU will have a significant restatement and possible that its auditor will resign.

OLAG Muddy Waters Reaction to Olam Frantic Response

Please read the full text through the detail link.

AMT Initiating Coverage on AMT – Strong Sell (Full Report)

We rate American Tower Corp. (NYSE: AMT) a Strong Sell and value it at $44.57 per share, representing downside of 40%. AMT has serious challenges domestically and internationally that have not been factored into the stock price. It has engaged in a value destroying investment binge overseas, and we have identified a significant material misstatement in the Company’s accounts that could amount to fraud.

LKM Initiating Coverage on NQ Mobile Inc. (NYSE: NQ) – Strong Sell

NQ is a massive fraud. We believe it is a “Zero”. At least 72% of NQ’s purported 2012 China security revenue is fictitious. NQ’s largest customer by far is really NQ. Our research estimates that NQ’s real market share in China is only about 1.5%, versus the approximately 55% it reports. We estimate that its China paying user base is less than 250,000, versus the six million NQ claims.

1228 Muddy Waters is Short Superb Summit (1228.HK)

In “Superb Summit (Part I): It’s a Long Way Down from Here” Muddy Waters explains why we are short 1228.HK. In this 18-page report, we show that virtually all of its reported 2012 and 2013 revenue belongs to a different company, its recent acquisition of a stake in coal liquefaction company Beijing Jinfeite (“JFT”) is utterly without substance because JFT is effectively a one-man operation, and Superb has an unbroken seven-year track record of completely failing in every new line of business it has purportedly pursued. In short, Superb’s raison d’etre is being a public company.

NOBGY Muddy Waters is Short Noble Group Ltd (NOBL:SP)

Muddy Waters is short Noble Group Limited (“Noble”). Noble seems to exist solely to borrow and burn cash. According to Bloomberg, Noble has been free cash flow positive only four out of 20 years – in other words, it literally generates positive free cash flow once every five years! According to Bloomberg, since 1997 Noble has raised from banks and markets net $7.7 billion. Noble’s debt is now almost four billion dollars. (A recent estimate, which Noble has not contested, is that due to repo-style transactions, Noble’s intra-quarter debt is approximately $3 billion greater than reported.)

TELIA Muddy Waters is Short TeliaSonera (TLSN.ST)

We are short the securities of TeliaSonera (TLSN.ST) because we believe information that is being withheld from investors, along with the current board and management’s (in)actions, will significantly impact the company’s shares and credit profile. While TeliaSonera has provided some transparency into its misdeeds in Uzbekistan, it has not made public the likelihood that the company’s other Eurasian and Nepal operations suffer from similar problems, and on a massive scale. It appears that TeliaSonera made corrupt payments in Uzbekistan exceeding SEK 3.1 billion (US$380 million). Uzbekistan appears to be only the tip of the iceberg. We estimate – perhaps conservatively – that TeliaSonera could have made corrupt payments throughout its Eurasia and Nepal operations that exceed SEK 17 billion (US$2.1 billion). In addition, TeliaSonera is potentially obligated to make additional payment to a problematic partner in Azerbaijan of up to SEK 7.6 billion (US$934.5 million).

CO Muddy Waters is Short Groupe Casino (CO:FP)

Groupe Casino (CO FP) is one of the most overvalued and misunderstood companies we have ever come across. The basic problem with Casino is that its financial statements are literally meaningless to understanding the company’s (poor) health. They do not distinguish between what Casino owns and what it owes. (Spoiler: we estimate Casino’s LTM leverage ratio at 8.9x.)

SAX Muddy Waters is Short Ströer (SAX:GR)

Ströer went public in 2010 as a Germany-based operator of billboards, with the founders Dirk Ströer and Udo Müller floating 47.8% of the company’s shares – they still hold about 42% of the shares today. The business was steadily growing, but perhaps a bit boring. The stock price languished. At the end of 2012, it was down 40% from its IPO, and trading at 7x EV / EBITDA. But something big changed in 2013. Ströer unveiled a “digital” strategy based on three pillars – acquiring a group of online businesses in Turkey and Poland, buying a couple of online ad exchanges, and buying a few online advertising businesses from Dirk Ströer and Udo Müller, who is still the CEO of Ströer. This all seemed to make sense – old world advertising meeting the new, Ströer striving to become number one in Germany in online and offline, a bold company that grasped what others weren’t yet seeing…

STJ MW is Short c (STJ:US)

Muddy Waters Capital is short St. Jude Medical, Inc. (STJ US). There is a strong possibility that close to half of STJ’s revenue is about to disappear for approximately two years. STJ’s pacemakers, ICDs, and CRTs might – and in our view, should – be recalled and remediated. (These devices collectively were 46% of STJ’s 2015 revenue.) Based on conversations with industry experts, we estimate remediation would take at least two years. Even lacking a recall, the product safety issues we present in this report offer unnecessary health risks and should receive serious notice among hospitals, physicians and cardiac patients.

6594 MW is Short Nidec Corp. (6594:JP)

Muddy Waters Capital LLC (“Muddy Waters”) is short Nidec, and we value its shares at JPY 4,764. We view Nidec as a gigantic stock promotion. The company’s management, led by Mr. Shigenobu Nagamori, repeatedly give uber-bullish predictions about Nidec’s business, and then massively misses them. Nidec missed a three-year forward sales projection by 29%. The company missed its 2015 sales target of JPY 2,000 billion by 41%, and now tells investors that number is its 2020 target. Nidec missed a two-year projected overall operating profit target by 27%. Nidec’s track record with short, medium, and long-term projections in its Automotive product group seems even worse.

6863 China Huishan Dairy Holdings Co Ltd

We are short China Huishan Dairy Holdings (6863 HK / “Huishan”) because we believe it is worth close to Zero. We conclude Huishan is a fraud. In this first report on Huishan, we detail the following conclusions and supporting facts. Since at least 2014, the company has reported fraudulent profits largely based on the lie that it is substantially self-sufficient in producing alfalfa. We found overwhelming evidence that Huishan has long purchased substantial quantities of alfalfa from third parties, which gives us no doubt that Huishan’s financials are fraudulent. We believe Huishan has engaged in CapEx fraud related to its cow farms. We estimate that Huishan has overstated the spending on these farms by RMB 893 million to RMB 1.6 billion. The primary purpose of the CapEx fraud is likely to support the company’s income statement fraud.

GAU Muddy Waters is Short Asanko Gold Inc. (AKG:CN)

We are short AKG because we believe it is highly likely to end up a Zero. On the back of flawed geology, AKG made investments in Nkran, its satellite pits, and Esaase that we believe will never be recovered. Nkran is already experiencing a serious collapse of its west wall that we believe is a sign of AKG’s desperation. We estimate AKG needs to spend $75 – $115 million soon to keep mining Nkran, or the mine will “pinch out”. Spending the money likely means AKG will run out of liquidity in 2018; not spending the money leaves the company without the cash flow to develop its largest deposit, Esaase.

1999 MW Response to Man Wah (1999:HK)

Muddy Waters, LLC (“Muddy Waters”) announced in a presentation on June 7, 2017 that we are short Man Wah Holdings Ltd. (“MWH”, 1999 HK). MWH promptly halted the stock and on June 9th issued a clarification announcement in response. MWH’s response accurately quotes the presentation slides, although it does not present the complete deck. We address MWH’s response. Our opinion remains that MWH is likely committing fraud. We presented six arguments in the presentation: MWH’s profitability is an outlier, Macau profits – a red flag, Panjiva data casts doubt on export sales, Fieldwork casts doubt on the China growth story, MWH has inconsistencies in taxes, a strong indicator of fraud, MWH has undisclosed debt

PRTA MW is Short Prothena Corp PLC (PRTA:US)

We are short PRTA. The publicly-available data, in our opinion, does not show that NEOD001 is efficacious. Our impression appears to run contrary to that of the sell-side. We believe that perceived positive responses to the drug are quite possibly – if not likely – due to previous plasma cell directed (“PCD”) therapy, and also to the manner in which some early trial data has been presented. Further, NEOD001’s proposed mechanism of action is not proven.

OSIS MW is Short OSI Systems (NASDAQ: OSIS)

We are short OSI Systems, Inc. (OSIS.US) because we think it is rotten to the core. We believe it obtained a major turnkey contract in Albania through corruption. It is likely that OSIS’s accounts are misstated as a result. We believe the pricing of its Mexico turnkey contract does not stand up to scrutiny. We estimate that the contract is so rich, it accounted for more than 50% of OSIS’s FY2017 EBITDA, despite being only 15% of revenue. Put another way, we estimate the Mexico contract’s EBITDA margin is approximately 55%, which would mean the rest of OSIS has an EBITDA margin of a paltry 7.5%. This contract is up for renewal in 2018, and non-renewal would seemingly have an enormous impact on OSIS’s profits. It also implies that there is significant room for price adjustment downward, which could have a material impact on profits. Former employees’ statements support our view that OSIS is rotting from the inside.

FRGT MW is Short China Internet Financial Services (NASDAQ: CIFS)

We conclude that China Internet Financial Services Inc. (NASDAQ:CIFS) is a King Zero – just another worthless China fraud. We believe zero to almost none of CIFS’s purported business is real. PRC financials show that CIFS overstated its 2016 revenue by 5x. Every one of the purported borrowers to which CIFS disclosed having made loans (accounting for 84.2% of loan balances) appears to be a sham counterparty. (The purported borrowers of the remaining 15.8% of reported loan balances were not disclosed; however, we strongly suspect that most – if not all – of these loans and associated income are also fabrications.) Therefore, the associated loans, revenue, and profits appear to be completely fake.

IQE MW is Short IQE (AIM: IQE LN)

Muddy Waters Capital LLC is short IQE. IQE is, in our opinion, an egregious accounting manipulator. We adjust downward the company’s reported net income for 2015 and 2016, respectively, by 58.5% and 25.4%. We believe it is reasonable to adjust 1H 2017 net income down by approximately £5 million or 69% to account for likely aggressive capitalization of expenses.

TAL MW is Short TAL Education Group (NYSE: TAL US)

Muddy Waters is short TAL Education Group. Investors might recall the dark days of 2010 and 2011, during which numerous U.S.-listed China companies went down as frauds. According to the recent documentary, the China Hustle, there were approximately 400 frauds from China listed on U.S. exchanges. Out of literally hundreds of blatant frauds, almost no company chairman did any prison time. Charlie Munger is fond of saying “Show me the incentive, and I’ll show you the outcome”. Defrauding U.S. investors from China has proven to be a “heads I win, tails you lose” proposition. So, it does not shock us when we see that TAL began fraudulently creating profits as early as FY2016. Since the beginning of FY2016, the value of Chairman Zhang’s shares have skyrocketed from $900 million to close to $7.5 billion. The prospect of becoming Bobby Axelrod rich is a powerful incentive, especially when you have no downside if caught.

MFC MW is Short Manulife Financial Corp. (NYSE: MFC US)

Muddy Waters is short Manulife Financial Corp. (“MFC”). MFC’s life insurance subsidiary, The Manufacturers Life Insurance Company (“Manulife”), just concluded a trial that could significantly damage its earnings, capital, creditworthiness, business, and solvency – per its own expert’s sworn affidavit. We believe a verdict is likely by the end of this year. There are therefore material risks to the financial wellbeing of MFC. We do not believe investors are aware of these risks, nor do we believe they have been priced into MFC shares.

INGN MW is Short Inogen, Inc. (INGN US)

Muddy Waters is short Inogen, Inc. (INGN) because we believe management has created an egregiously false narrative about the Total Addressable Market (“TAM”) size and growth. We estimate the U.S. market is 1.3 million users. The data shows us that the market is actually shrinking. We believe that even though POC penetration will continue to increase, because the market is near saturation and is shrinking on one hand and the long usable lives of equipment on the other, INGN will hit peak sales no later than next year.

2020 ANTA Part I: Turds in the Punchbowl (2020.HK)

We thought long and hard about the title of this report, which is the first in a series evidencing endemic fraud at ANTA. We kept coming back to “Turds in the Punchbowl.” ANTA is a real business, and in terms of operations and marketing, there’s much to be admired. Presumably, this is why accomplished sportswear entrepreneur Chip Wilson recently agreed to invest in it.[1] But within all this goodness, there’s a distinctly awful truth. Investors cannot rely upon ANTA’s financials. We believe that ANTA posts industry-leading operating margins not because it’s so well operated; but, rather because ANTA uses numerous secretly controlled Tier 1 distributors to fraudulently boost its margins.

BUR MW is Short Burford Capital Ltd. (BUR LN)

We are short BUR. For years, it was the ultimate “trust me” stock. Thanks to a light disclosure regime, the esoteric nature of its business, and unethical behavior by its largest shareholder, Invesco, it turned Enron-esque mark-to-model accounting into the biggest stock promotion on the AIM. This has all recently changed though. Just this year, BUR began publishing more detailed investment data. This data proves that BUR has been egregiously misrepresenting its ROIC and IRRs, as well as the state of its overall business. We have identified seven methods by which BUR manipulates Concluded Investment ROIC and IRR.

4587 Muddy Waters is Short PeptiDream, Inc. (4587.JP)

Muddy Waters Capital is short PeptiDream, Inc. because we believe it is more stock story than substance, and the market is deluded as to its potential for commercializing drugs. PeptiDream touts its 19 major partnerships and 101 discovery programs, but half of its partnerships are likely effectively dormant or dead. We see it being highly unlikely that the company’s own development attempts ever yield significant revenue. PeptiDream’s recent shift in focus to developing its own pipeline recalls once-beloved Sosei Group Corporation (“Sosei”), which has lost significant market cap over the past three years. We forecast PeptiDream will have at most one drug commercialized by 2027, versus investor expectations of eight to 15 by then.

NMC MW is Short NMC Health plc (NMC.LN)

We are short NMC Health plc. We have serious doubts about the company’s financial statements, including its asset values, cash balance, reported profits, and reported debt levels. At the worst of times, the company has invested in large assets at costs that we find too high to be plausible – including from parties we believe are de facto under common control. This behavior gives rise to concerns about fraudulent asset values and theft of company assets. At somewhat better times, the company seems to “only” materially mislead, such as by trying to give investors the (false) impression it does not engage in reverse factoring, and by understating (we believe intentionally) lease debt.

EHTH MW is Short eHealth Inc. (EHTH US)

EHTH’s highly aggressive accounting masks what we believe is a significantly unprofitable business. Based on variable costs alone, we estimate that EHTH will lose approximately -$135 from each MA member it enrolled in 2019. If also including fixed costs, our per MA member loss estimate becomes -$402. We adjust 2019 revenue down by $128 million or 25%. We adjust 2019 operating profit down by $263 million due to subjective and misapplied mark-to-model accounting, yielding an operating loss of -$181 million. EHTH’s persistence assumptions in its LTV model seem highly aggressive when compared to reality. After ASC 606 went into effect, member churn immediately skyrocketed. We conclude that EHTH is pursuing low quality, lossmaking growth while its LTVs are based on lower churn, pre-growth cohorts. We conclude that the key driver of growth since 2018 has been EHTH’s reliance on Direct Response television advertising, which attracts an unprofitable, high churn enrollee.

GOTU MW is Short GSX Techedu Inc. (GSX US)

We are short GSX because we conclude that it is a near-total fraud. We conclude that at least ~70% of its users are fake, and we think it’s quite likely that at least ~80% of its users are fake. Our conclusions are based on GSX’s own user and attendance data files (i.e., this is not from “scraping” data). We downloaded GSX’s data from more than 200 paid K-12 classes covering 54,065 unique users.

NNOX MW is Short Nano-X Imaging Ltd. (NNOX US)

We are short NNOX because we think it is a much bigger piece of garbage than Nikola will ever be. There are important similarities, though. Nikola rolled a truck down the hill to try to prove it’s real. NNOX almost certainly used somebody else’s chest images to try to make its ARC machine look real. Both Nikola and NNOX try to legitimize themselves by using the halo of respectable companies. Nikola gave a bunch of stock away to GM. Nanox issued options for 1.2 million shares at $2.21 per share (worth ~$32.1 million) to the president of SK Telecom after SK Telecom happened to invest in NNOX.

MPLN MultiPlan: Private Equity Necrophilia Meets The Great 2020 Money Grab (MPLN US)

Muddy Waters is short shares and credit of MultiPlan Corp f/k/a Churchill Capital Corp III. Our key reasons are: MPLN is in the process of losing its largest client, UnitedHealthcare (“UHC”). UHC has formed a competitor to MPLN that offers significantly lower prices and fewer conflicts of interest. The competitor is called Naviguard. We understand that by the end of 2022, Naviguard aims to convert all key UHC accounts, which constitute the majority of MPLN’s UHC business. We estimate that this defection and competition will decrease 2022E revenue by 35% and levered free cash flow by 80%, while net leverage should balloon to more than 8.0x. MPLN was already in financial decline, and its financial statements were engineered to obscure this existing deterioration. We understand that in 2018, MPLN released revenue reserves, dropping them from approximately 30% to 10% of revenue, which we believe enabled MPLN to show 2018 EBITDA growth amid shrinking sales.

YY MW is Short Joyy Inc. (YY US)

It was clear to us from early on that YY Live was almost entirely fake. YY Live is an ecosystem of mirages. Its supposedly high-earning performers in reality take home only a fraction of their reported totals. The purportedly independent channel owners are largely controlled by YY in order to facilitate continuous sham transactions. The legions of benefactor fans are almost entirely bots operating from YY’s internal network (~50% of YY Live gift volume), bots operating from external bot farms, and performers roundtripping gifts to themselves. We conclude that YY Live is ~90% fraudulent. YY’s international livestreaming business, Bigo, seems barely more real.

XL MW is Short XL Fleet Corp. (XL US)

Muddy Waters is short XL Fleet Corp. (NYSE: XL) because it strikes us as middle of the fairway SPAC garbage. We conclude that the real green technology at XL is duping investors into throwing money at this company through a collection of exaggerations, half-truths, and mistruths. XL’s previous equity raise (Series D) appears to have been at a valuation of approximately $73 million, which is a far cry from its SPAC valuation.

LMND Open Letter to Lemonade: Egregious Security Vulnerability (LMND US)

In the course of using Lemonade’s site to do fundamental business research, it was accidentally discovered that Lemonade’s site contains an unforgivably negligent security flaw that potentially exposes its customers’ personally identifiable information.

S30 Solutions 30 SE

We have been short S30 since May 2019, and it has been a long and strange journey. We analogize the present situation to this: Imagine if you thought your partner is cheating on you with another. You arrive at your house at a moment you believe the cheating is taking place, and see your partner’s car in the driveway, along with an another, unknown car. You enter and stop outside your shared bedroom. The door is closed, and you hear sounds from inside indicating both parties are putting in gold medal performances. But the door is locked – you cannot open it. You are now EY.

DNMR MW is Short Danimer Scientific, Inc. (DNMR US)

Muddy Waters is short DNMR. We conclude that DNMR has significantly misrepresented the state of its customer relationships, product development, readiness to scale, and TAM for PHAs. Both the money that DNMR spent buying Novomer and the cash it intends to spend on capacity expansion strike us as Hail Marys – spending money based on hope rather than on realism.

BEKE MW is Short KE Holdings Inc. (BEKE US)

We are short BEKE because we conclude the Company is engaged in systemic fraud, by our estimate, inflating its new home sales GTV by over ~126% and its commission revenues by approximately ~77–96%. We found massive discrepancies between the transaction volumes, store count and agent count reported to investors and the transaction data from our multi-month data collection program from BEKE’s platform. We corroborated these discrepancies by spot-checking our findings through primary due diligence on BEKE’s stores, including field interviews and site visits.

HASI MW is Short Hannon Armstrong Sustainable Infrastructure Capital, Inc. (HASI US)

We are short Hannon Armstrong Sustainable Infrastructure Capital, Inc. (HASI) because its accounting is so complex and misleading that its financial statements are effectively meaningless. HASI is a prime example of how public market incentives can warp a company into relentlessly destroying value to feed a Wall Street growth narrative. Most of HASI’s income is both non-cash and unrealizable: It has little relationship with cash to be received in the future.

RUN MW is Short Sunrun Inc. (RUN US)

Muddy Waters is short Sunrun Inc. (RUN) because we see it as an uneconomic business built on three shaky pillars: The equity story of exaggerated “Subscriber Values” and “Gross / Net Earning Assets”, funding growth through abusing tax incentives, and issuing ABS that could be exposed to a RUN bankruptcy. These pillars, in turn, are built on a foundation of dubious financial models. If one of these three pillars wobbles, RUN would likely face a funding gap and would require equity issuances to continue growing. Insiders have already become ultra-wealthy, having net sold shares since July 2020 for $205.9 million. RUN is on its third CFO since January 2020.

UTA Glaucus Research is Short Universal Travel Group

In this report, we present compelling evidence that Universal Travel Group (“UTA” or the “company”) is falsifying its publicly filed financial statements. We believe that UTA’s SEC financial statements greatly exaggerate the company’s revenue, cash balance and net income. UTA is actually a tiny and antiquated brick-and-mortar travel business, and its management is lying about the size and sophistication of the business in order to misappropriate funds from investors.

GFRE Glaucus Research is Short Gulf Resources, Inc.

In this report, we present compelling evidence that a rival, privately-held Chinese conglomerate owned by GFRE’s chairman and founder claims to own GFRE’s business. This suggests that insiders at GFRE perpetrated a fraud on investors: they took cash from the capital markets claiming that GFRE owned the underlying business when in fact the two Chinese subsidiaries that own and operate the business are privately owned by a company controlled by the chairman. We believe that, given the difficulty of litigating in China and the complex multi-jurisdictional organizational structure of GFRE, shareholders are most likely left without a remedy. In short,investors in this NASDAQ-listed company are likely holding worthless paper in a shell company.

LLEN Glaucus Research is Short L&L Energy, Inc.

In this report, we carve through the company’s SEC financial statements and highlight many suspicious features of the company’s ostensible record, including the fact that LLEN easily outperforms its competitors (including Chinese firms) despite its small size and despite the fact that its executive management team had little experience operating a coal mine prior to achieving such spectacular results. We also present compelling evidence that contrary to claims in its SEC filings, the company does not legally own certain assets. Chinese filings indicate that corporate funds were used to acquire a coal coking factory that is currently held in a sole proprietorship under the sole ownership of LLEN’s CEO and chairman.We have also found evidence that LLEN has not properly disclosed the company’s ownership stake in other assets and subsidiaries.

CMED Glaucus Research is Short China Medical Technologies, Inc.

A few weeks ago an anonymous short seller posted a blog entry on GeoInvesting’s website alleging that CMED committed fraud by, among other things, overpaying for acquisitions from undisclosed related parties. We here at Glaucus Research follow the U.S.-listed Chinese space closely,so we were naturally curious. We decided to investigate the allegations of fraud. Hereis what we found. We believe that the evidence supports the anonymous blogger’s allegations that CMED committed fraud by overpaying for an acquisition from an entity that appears to be secretly related to CMED’s founder, CEO and chairman. Although we could not verify all of the claims by the anonymous blogger, there are a host of other red flags to support the notion that CMED is the next Longtop (LFT) or Universal Travel (UTA).

0773 Glaucus Research is Short China Metal Recycling Holdings

China Metal Recycling Holdings Ltd. (“CMR” or the “Company”) purports to be the largest scrap metal recycling company in China. We believe that this is a lie. Publicly accessible import data from the Chinese government suggests that CMR is a blatant fraud that has deceived the market about the size of its business.

1259 Glaucus Research is Short Prince Frog International Holdings Ltd.

PRINCE FROG INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LIMITED (“Prince Frog” or the “Company”) is a People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) based producer of childcare products that raised RMB 536mm in a 2011 Hong Kong IPO. In this report, we present Nielsen retail sales data, a PRC government survey on consumer brand awareness, public tax records, and SAIC filings that, in our opinion, all independently indicate that Prince Frog’s actual sales are less than 25% of the figures reported in the Company’s public filings. We expect trading in the Company’s shares to be halted and its equity to be worth between HKD 0.74 to HKD 0.98 per share.

0067 Glaucus Research is Short China Lumena New Materials Corp

CHINA LUMENA NEW MATERIALS CORP (“Lumena” or the “Company”) produces and sells thenardite and polyphenylene sulfide (“PPS”) products in China. We believe that Lumena has made numerous material misrepresentations to investors and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (“HKEX”), both in its 2009 IPO prospectus and in subsequent financial statements. In this report we present publicly available tax records and stamped hard copies of SAIC filings which, in our opinion, indicate that Lumena’s sales are 90% less than the sales reported to investors and regulators in the Company’s Hong Kong filings.

ROLTA Glaucus Research is Short Rolta Bonds

We believe that in reality, Rolta’s business does not generate free cash flow and that Rolta cannot repay foreign bondholders without refinancing. Indeed, we suspect Rolta approached foreign bond markets because it was unable to borrow in India. Ultimately, we believe that bondholders and ratings agencies have failed to price in evidence that Rolta has materially misstated its financial performance and the risk that Rolta will default on its Junk Bonds. We value the bonds at the recovery value of the offshore assets, which we estimate to be USD 0.16 on the dollar.

3823 Glaucus Research is Short Tech Pro

Tech Pro Technology Development Limited (HK: 3823) (“Tech Pro” or the “Company”) is a rollup of unrelated businesses: it manufactures and sells LED lighting products, it is a sub-leasing agent for a commercial real estate property in Shanghai, and it recently purchased a French soccer team. In this report we present publicly available SAIC filings, which, in our opinion, indicate that Tech Pro has massively overstated its reported profits and inflated the reported purchase price of its acquisitions. We believe that Tech Pro is an obvious fraud, that its equity is worth HKD 0.00 and trading of its stock should be halted to protect future investors from further losses and hopefully provide a modicum of recovery for shareholders and creditors.

TFC Glaucus Research is Short TFS Corp - Quintis

We believe that TFS will likely follow Timbercorp and Great Southern into ignominy and failure. In our opinion, TFS’s model resembles such collapsed agricultural MIS companies and their Ponzi-like structure: TFS does not generate significant cash from sales of its sandalwood, which for the most part has yet to be harvested. Instead, TFS is reliant on raising capital to plant new vintages, operate its business, make payments on its ballooning debts and pay off earlier investors. Interest payments reached 50% of cash EBITDA in FY 2016, and total borrowing has increased by another AU$ 65 million so far in FY 2017. Without access to the capital markets, TFS’s financial statements indicate it will struggle to service its debts, let alone repay them.

0607 Glaucus Research is Short Fullshare Holdings

We believe that Fullshare Holdings Ltd. (HK: 0607) (“Fullshare” or the “Company”), a 2013 reverse merger, is one of the largest stock manipulation schemes trading on any exchange anywhere in the world. In our opinion, Fullshare resembles Tech Pro Technology (HK: 3823), Huishan Dairy (HK: 6863), and Hanergy (HK: 0566), schemes whose stock price collapsed in spectacular fashion. In this report, we present independent evidence from intraday trading patterns indicating, in our opinion, that Fullshare’s share price has been manipulated. We believe that insiders have used the smokescreen of a rising stock price to secretly transfer some of the Company’s most valuable assets to the chairman and his family.

BLA Glaucus Research is Short Blue Sky Alternative Investments, Ltd.

We believe Blue Sky compensates for its overstated AUM by charging clients egregious management fees, which can reach up to 17% of the capital invested in Blue Sky funds and are charged irrespective of the performance of the underlying investment. Because investors will soon wise up, we view Blue Sky’s fee revenues as inherently unsustainable. In other cases, such as private equity, we present evidence that Blue Sky has overstated its returns on many investments (a practice we believe is systematic). Through the overstatement of AUM and returns, Blue Sky inflates its current revenue and profits, driving up its stock price and attracting further capital.

1910 Blue Orca is Short Samsonite

Samsonite International SA (HK: 1910), the world’s largest luggage maker, is listed in Hong Kong and headquartered in Mansfield, Massachusetts, in the United States. Despite a history of mediocrity which included lurching from the precipice of one restructuring to another, today Samsonite trades near all-time highs. Indeed, Samsonite trades at a premium valuation in line with luxury brands such as Burberry (BRBY) on an EV/EBITDA multiple. We believe this premium is entirely unjustified, especially given Samsonite’s questionable accounting practices and poor corporate governance.

GDS Blue Orca is Short GDS Holdings

GDS Holdings Limited (“GDS” or the “Company”) is a US-listed developer and operator of data centers in China. GDS’s stock was up 400%+ in the last year until a recent pullback. Measured off its July 2018 highs, GDS was valued at an absurd 80x EV/ TTM EBITDA, even though its interest payments now exceed its reported gross profits. Investors have indulged GDS’s staggering debt burden because of the belief in its supposedly impressive growth. But our research indicates that in reality, GDS is borrowing crippling amounts of debt to enrich insiders by acquiring data centers from undisclosed related parties which are not nearly as valuable as the Company claims. We believe that since becoming a public Company, GDS has borrowed recklessly to siphon off at least RMB 696 million to insiders by inflating the purchase price of undisclosed related party acquisitions.

JD Blue Orca is Short Pinduoduo Inc.

Pinduoduo Inc. (NASDAQ: PDD) (“PDD” or the “Company”) purports to be China’s third-leading ecommerce platform behind Alibaba (NYSE: BABA) and JD.com (NASDAQ: JD). PDD’s meteoric rise has been near miraculous. Backed by famous venture capital firms and an investment by Tencent, in three years PDD supposedly went from a concept on a whiteboard to a USD 19 billion market capitalization. Market commentators have anointed it the fastest growing e-commerce company in the world.

CORT Blue Orca is Short Corcept Therapeutics

•Not only does Optime appear to be a captured specialty pharmacy, deriving most if not substantially all of its revenues from Corcept, but when we called Optime, its representative told us over a recorded phone call that Corcept and Optime were one and the same. We were then transferred to a second representative, introduced as a specialty pharmacy care coordinator, who reiterated that we had reached Corcept. We placed a recording of the call on YouTube (here) for any interested investor to listen. We believe, based on this evidence, that Corcept’s sole specialty pharmacy and exclusive distributor is an undisclosed related party. If Optime’s employees believe that Corcept and Optime are one and the same, then it creates the material risk that the Company is using its captured pharmacy to boost sales, hide losses or engage in other financial shenanigans. We can’t know for sure because Optime’s financials are not publicly available.

1360 Mega Expo Holdings Ltd.

Like Tech Pro and China DYF, we believe that Mega Expo is an obvious fraud, that its equity is worth HKD 0.00, and that trading of its stock should be halted to protect future investors and hopefully provide a modicum of recovery for shareholders and creditors.

1360 Mega Expo Holdings Ltd.

Like Tech Pro and China DYF, we believe that Mega Expo is an obvious fraud, that its equity is worth HKD 0.00, and that trading of its stock should be halted to protect future investors and hopefully provide a modicum of recovery for shareholders and creditors.

1360 Mega Expo Holdings Ltd.

Like Tech Pro and China DYF, we believe that Mega Expo is an obvious fraud, that its equity is worth HKD 0.00, and that trading of its stock should be halted to protect future investors and hopefully provide a modicum of recovery for shareholders and creditors.

1360 Mega Expo Holdings Ltd.

Like Tech Pro and China DYF, we believe that Mega Expo is an obvious fraud, that its equity is worth HKD 0.00, and that trading of its stock should be halted to protect future investors and hopefully provide a modicum of recovery for shareholders and creditors.

1360 Mega Expo Holdings Ltd.

Like Tech Pro and China DYF, we believe that Mega Expo is an obvious fraud, that its equity is worth HKD 0.00, and that trading of its stock should be halted to protect future investors and hopefully provide a modicum of recovery for shareholders and creditors.

1360 Mega Expo Holdings Ltd.

Like Tech Pro and China DYF, we believe that Mega Expo is an obvious fraud, that its equity is worth HKD 0.00, and that trading of its stock should be halted to protect future investors and hopefully provide a modicum of recovery for shareholders and creditors.

1717 Blue Orca is Short Ausnutria Dairy Corp Ltd.

Our extensive investigation indicates, in our opinion, that the Company inflates revenues, hides costs, misleads Chinese consumers and secretly enriches executives through undisclosed related party transactions. Accordingly, we apply a 25% governance discount to its P/E multiple, which we think is conservative considering that, in our opinion, Ausnutria is a governance nightmare whose financials should not be relied upon. After adjusting its revenue to reflect the independent evidence, we value Ausnutria at HKD 5.78 per share, a 53% downside from its last traded price. Ultimately, we view Ausnutria as simply uninvestable.

496 Blue Orca is Short Kasen International Holdings Ltd.

Today, Kasen’s only viable segment is property development, a melting ice cube as the Company sells off the last of its remaining residential units. Given that its other segments generated losses, at best Kasen should be valued on a price-to-book ratio of other similarly situated situated Hong Kong property developers (0.5x). After adjusting Kasen’s net asset value to account for projects or assets we think do not exist, we value Kasen at HKD 0.67 per share, an 85% downside from its last traded price. This is likely conservative, as a Company which fabricates capital expenditures and allows the chairman’s family to loot the public vehicle of its most valuable business is, in our opinion, simply uninvestable.

867 Blue Orca is Short China Medical System Holdings

In our opinion, evidence suggests that the Company exaggerates its financial performance, inflates profits and conceals that dwindling Company profits are used to privately enrich its chairman. If we value the Company on the profits CMS discloses to Chinese authorities and apply a modest 25% corporate governance discount to its P/E multiple, we value CMS at HKD 3.95 per share, a 62% downside from its current price. Yet given overwhelming evidence suggesting that CMS misleads investors, we believe that CMS is simply uninvestable.

6186 Blue Orca is Short China Feihe Ltd.

In this report, we present multiple independent data points which, in our opinion, indicate that Feihe overstates IMF revenues, understates billions in operating costs such as advertising and labor expenses, understates headcount by as much as 10x, and materially inflates profitability. Notably, Feihe recognizes revenue when it hands products to its logistics providers, which Feihe repeatedly insists are independent third parties. But our investigation indicates that Feihe’s primary logistics company, which claims to transport most if not all of its products, is run by a Feihe employee and operates as part of the Company. We believe that this is fatal to Feihe’s credibility, and to the integrity of its financials.

SEK Blue Orca is Short SEEK Ltd.

We think Zhaopin’s platform is rotten, which is devastating for Seek’s prospects. Seek has historically paid a dividend, giving the false impression that its business produces healthy profits and cash flows. But these payments have been largely funded by debt. A serial acquirer, Seek has repeatedly tapped the capital markets to fund acquisitions, raising its Net Debt-to-reported EBITDA to 3.2x. By our calculation, Seek’s true leverage is much higher. Rather than valuing Seek as a fast-growing online recruiting platform, we value Seek for what it is—a slow or no-growth platform whose core business is shrinking and which carries a dangerous amount of debt. Even if we value Seek’s Australian and nonChina businesses at a generous 20.5x EV/adjusted EBITDA, we believe Zhaopin merits a substantial discount. We value Seek at AUD 7.20 per share, a 69% downside from its last traded price.

SY Blue Orca is Short So-Young International Inc.

Lips can be fake. Financials shouldn’t be. We wrote code to scrape the transaction data on SY’s platform and cross-checked the data by calling the clinics to verify the number of procedures actually performed. The results showed widespread fake bookings, indicating, in our opinion, that SY is fabricating the popularity of its platform and exaggerating the revenues derived from it. In our view, SY’s financials and its booking platform are about as real as its customers’ faces.

HYZN Blue Orca is Short Hyzon Motors Inc.

We are short Hyzon Motors Inc (“Hyzon” or the “Company”) (NASDAQ: HYZN), a zero -revenue hydrogen EV SPAC which we liken to a Chinese Lordstown Motors. In our opinion, Hyzon’s supposed major customers are a fake-looking Chinese shell company incorporated three days before the deal announcement and a tiny New Zealand startup which told us they are not really a customer.

SLI Blue Orca is Short Standard Lithium Ltd.

Standard Lithium has told investors that the technology has already achieved “proof of concept” and that its Demonstration Plant is a success. Yet undisclosed to investors, production records filed by Standard Lithium with the Arkansas regulator indicate that actual recovery rates are far lower than projected by the Company, indicating that the Demonstration Plant is extracting far lower quantities of lithium than should be the case. The data also shows that recovery rates are getting substantially worse the more brine is processed, suggesting the pilot facility has negative scale. In short, we think this regulatory data is a smoking gun which indicates that the technology is neither economically viable nor scalable. Standard Lithium’s absurd valuation rests solely on the viability of this Demonstration Plant, making this data, in our opinion, near fatal to the Company’s NPV projections and therefore its stock price.

LICY Blue Orca is Short Li-Cycle Holdings Corp.

We are short Li-Cycle Holdings Corp. (“Li-Cycle” or the “Company”), a battery recycling SPAC trading at 96.8x LTM revenues on the promise of a low cost, low capital expenditure recycling model. But such promise is a fiction. In our opinion, Li-Cycle is a near fatal combination of stock promotion, laughable governance, a broken business hemorrhaging cash, and highly questionable Enron-like accounting.

HPR Blue Orca is Short Innovative Industrial Properties, Inc.

We are short Innovative Industrial Properties, Inc. (the “Company” or “IIPR”), a marijuana bank masquerading as a REIT. IIPR’s model is to conduct sale-leaseback transactions with cannabis producers who are otherwise prohibited from borrowing money because of federal regulations.

MNSO Blue Orca is Short MINISO Group Holding Limited

We are short MINISO Group Holding Limited (the “Company” or “MINISO”), a global retailer based in China which claims to operate an asset-light, high-margin network of over 5,000 allegedly independent franchise stores selling stuffed animals, plush toys and knickknacks.

PLL Piedmont Lithium Inc.

We are short Piedmont because without Atlantic’s Ghana supply, Piedmont and any promise of near-term revenue from its much-hyped Tennessee facility are dead on arrival. Without Ghana, industry experts and even a former Piedmont senior executive have confirmed that Piedmont is unlikely to find a source of replacement spodumene. Additionally, FOIA requests we obtained from the Department of Energy (“DOE”) suggest that the spodumene from Ghana was important to Piedmont’s grant proposal, meaning that the loss of the offtake agreement, and questions surrounding Piedmont’s own potential liability under the FCPA and other anti-corruption statutes, raise doubt about whether Piedmont will ultimately receive the conditional government funding.

STEM STEM Inc.

Our extensive due diligence has uncovered that undisclosed to investors, STEM is financing its flagship customer to purchase energy storage systems from STEM. Rather than a “big win” and proof that STEM could compete for big utility scale projects, we think STEM won its supposed flagship deal by surreptitiously paying for it.

EBIX The Truth About Ebix, Robin Raina, and the Robin Raina Foundation

• Ebix will restate historical results – likely signi ficantly – as a result of the issues covered in this report & elsew here. • Ebix stock should be halted until the financial sta tements are reliable, accurate, and complete. • Cherry Bekaert Holland should not sign off on Ebix’ s 2012 financials, without Ebix Singapore’s 2011 and 2012 filings. • Ebix’s stated tax strategy is supported by sham in fact and/or sham in substance transactions. • Ebix shares are worth no more than $5.00/share, & approach $0.00 as the IRS, debt, & other risks unfo ld.

TTSH The Tile Shop: Like Crazy Eddie's, but with an Undisclosed Related Party & a Chinese Twist

Tile Shop’s 2013 LTM earnings are overstated by over 200%. TTS’s actual 2013 LTM EPS is closer to $ 0.18/share . TTS will restate several years’ historical results as a result of the issues covered in this report. The company has used its China - based undisclosed related party and improper accounting to overstate profits. Gross margins will continue to decline through 2014, as TTS must reverse p rior years’ accounting overstatements. Tile Shop’s shares ar e worth no more than $1.54 - $3.34 /share, implying 84% - 93% downside. TTS’s creditors will likely restrict additional indebtedness & capital expenditures until TTS’s accounting is corrected.

BCOR Blucora ( i.e. Infospace) : Worse Than Blinkx plc & Babylon Ltd

+60% of BCOR’s revenue will evaporate in coming quarters, as Google realizes it is better off without BCOR. Google and Yahoo c an w alk a way from Blucora any time. At least 50% of BCOR’s traffic is derived from malware, click fraud, illicit traffic (e.g. child pornography), and otherwise suspect traffic. Blucora and its partners’ practices will receive scrutiny from Google, advertisers, FTC, DOJ, FBI, IRS, &/or the SEC. BCOR shares are worth no more than $5.00/share, and <$1.00/share if BCOR compensates affected parties.

QPP Quindell: A Country Club Built On Quicksand

42% - 80% of Quindell’s profits are suspect, as we are unable to reconcile the whole with the sum of the parts. Quindell was little more than a country club until 2008/2009, yet QPP somehow began reporting Microsoft/Google - esque profit margins in 2010/2011 . 26% - 43% of Quindell ’s 2009 and 2010 revenues came from Clickus4.com, a subsidiary owned by CEO Robert Terry. 41% of Quindell’s 2011 revenues came from an undisclosed related party (controlled by a QPP executive). 10+ acquisitions lack economic substance. Several of the acqu ired companies are little more than paper companies.

GOW Let's Gowex: La Charada Pescanova (a Pescanovan Charade)

Gowex shares are worth €0.00 per share. Over 90% of Gowex’s reported revenues do not exist. We estimate GOW’s actual revenues to be <€10 million. The shares will be suspended, just as Pescanova’s s hares were suspended.

EIGU Endurance International Group: A Web of Deceit

EIGI shares will go to $0 .00 per share, as the company will struggle to service its debt. Normalized EBITDA margins do not cover interest expense . Recent years’ reported EBITDA benefited from attracting Blinkx - like revenue (spam/malware, terrorism, etc . ). EIG profits at the expen se of its customers (service outages, poor customer service, etc. )

MDCA MDC Partners: Like Valeant Pharmaceuticals, But with Understated Debts

MDCA shares are worthless than $1.00 per share, implying 96%+ downside. MDCA will restate several years’ historical results as a result of the issues covered in this report and elsewhere. The on-going SEC investigation will lead to new revelations of wrong-doing.

AR4.DE Aurelius: The Next Arques AG or the next Philip Green?

Aurelius’ shares are worth no more than €8.56 per share, implying at least -88% downside to its current share price. Aurelius may face similar scrutiny as Philip Green did in the UK, who was accused of systematically plundering BHS

2018 Why are AAC's reported profit margins higher AND smoother than Apple's? Part I (Preview)

GOTHAM CITY RESEARCH HAS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT: AAC has used 20+ undisclosed related parties & dubious accounting to overstate & smoothen profits since 2014. At least 20 undisclosed related party suppliers are owned or managed by AAC CEO’s family members or employees. These undisclosed related party suppliers are not listed in Apple’s supplier list, despite some claiming otherwise.  Some of the undisclosed related entities supply the same products as AAC does, are based in the same locations as AAC is, & hire employees under AAC’s name. AAC has used these hidden entities to evade Apple’s labor standards specified in the Apple Supplier Code of Conduct. Apple (and other parties) will conduct independent investigations, & validate our findings. As a result, AAC’s profit margins will decline, converging to its peers’ levels. AAC is in violation of Hong Kong listing rules, Apple’s supplier code of conduct, and its own representations.

CRTO Is Criteo Malware? And Why Does Criteo Refuse to Reveal to its Clients Where Their Ads Are Placed? Part I

Over 50% of Criteo's revenues originate from suspect sources (e.g. clickbots, fake/low quality websites, etc). Criteo takes credit for clients' sales it did not contribute to, and in some cases, that never actually occured. Clients will leave or demand reimbursements from Criteo, due to brand safety & revenue misattribution concerns. Sales& profits will decline because of Criteo's behavior, leading to a 67%-77% decline in its share price.

MED Medifast (NASDAQ: MED): LikeLumber Liquidators, But With Undisclosed Toxic Metals, and A Supply Chain Twist

21% to 74% of Optavia products contain contaminants. Optavia prices will decline, as prices are 2x 4x more expensive than peers’ products & programs. Nearly all Optavia products are not manufactured by the company, contradicting claims otherwise. MED will be required to add warning labels to its products. MED’s Optavia products (its “Fuelings”) will require recalls and/or third-party testing. Shares will decline 62%-86% the current prices

1619 Tianhe Chemicals

This report presents substantial,overwhelming, and conclusive evidencethat Tianhe is one of the largest stockmarket frauds ever conceived. SAIC filings and third-party documentsshow that Tianhe generates a fraction ofthe revenues and profits it reports. We present smoking gun evidence thatTianhe does not pay the taxes it claims,and therefore could not have generatedthe profits it claims. Site visits show that most of Tianhe’s SFCcustomers are related parties that shareoffices and overlapping management.

555 Betting on a Pipe Dream

We believe REXLot has made materially false representations to the market. Our analysis of third-party documents, SAIC filings, and market share data shows that REXLot generates only a fraction of the revenue it publicly reports. REXLot’s de minimis interest income suggests its publicly reported cash balance is grossly exaggerated.Since 2010, REXLot has been cumulatively free cash flow negative. REXLot has used convertible bond offerings to finance dividends and acquire suspect companies with no discernable assets or operations.

WU Accounting Concerns and a Tax Black Hole

WU has only missed earnings estimates once since the beginning of 2012, and wefind these consistent earnings beats questionable, especially from a mature company facing secular decline. We have concerns over WU’s accounting as it relates to cost capitalization and believe Management is manipulating earnings to influence its share price. WU’s unusually low tax rates, combined with the nature of a business model,viewed by many as predatory, raise concerns of public policy backlash

404 Error 404: Tenants not Found

We believe the current non-Executive Chairman is using Hsin Chong as his personal dumping ground for problematic and non-revenue generating development properties at the expense of minority shareholders. Site visits and satellite images suggest that Hsin Chong has misled investors about the commercial viability of its two biggest properties. Hsin Chong has been OCF negative in each of 2013, 2014, 2015 and interim 2016, and recently cut its long-standing dividend. We have serious concerns over its substantial debt obligations.

8207 The 30-Minute Trade

Credit China trades at 45x 2017 earnings,which we believe may be due to end-of-day trading manipulation, based on our analysis of intraday trading activity. Additionally, we believe Credit China has misled investors by engaging in a number of questionable transactions. In one example, online evidence suggests that the largest acquisition in Credit China’s public history was from an undisclosed related-party. In another example, we believe a major property purchase wascarried out to funnel money out of the Company and inflate earnings.

LKE J Capital is short Lake Resources (LKE ASX)

Lake Resources (LKE ASX) “Lake” is one of several lithium explorers planning to use an unproven direct lithium extraction (DLE) technology to remove lithium from brine. If Lake can get the DLE technology to work then it plans to build a $1 bln processing facility in a remote location in the Andes.Lake is claiming to produce “cleaner lithium.” We believe, however, DLE will still use large amounts of water and produce toxic waste. Lake has failed to get an operational pilot plant on site three years after promising it would. Lake insiders have successfully sold $8.1 mln in stock in the last year. Lake granted 41.5 mln options to financial institutions that published favorable research on the company. Insider share sales have followed a pattern of Lake announcement, followed by favorable research, stock price rise, and then insider sales. I

FFIE Move Over Lordstown: There’s a New EV Scam in Town

We don't think Faraday Future (FFIE), an EV SPAC, will ever sell a car. So far, it's nothing but a bucket to collect money from U.S. investors and pour it into the black hole of debt created by its founder, China's best-known securities fraudster, Jia Yueting.

BOO Yangtze River Port and Logistics

Boohoo’s margins seem too good to be true. One-quarter the size of industry leader ASOS, Boohoo boasts more than double its ebitda and net margins. Meanwhile, Boohoo buys from a blinding array of family-owned companies—and then acquires the companies. Even a sincere effort to keep it all at arm’s length would find the arrangements challenging.

IPO Not Impressed

IP Group has hurried to diversify risk from its biggest asset, Oxford Nanopore, a company that cannot make its technology work but whose valuation has been bloated by successive rounds of investment. Now, facing cash shortages, the company looks to be on the precipice of a major devaluation if not failure. That single company could drag down IPO’s price by 20%.IP Group is an accounting game more than a company and has an atrocious track record of delivering bankable returns.Private investors in IP Group share a collusive interest in creating high paper values for tech concept companies that generally fail. We think the company is worth half its posted value at best.

MARK Remark Holdings (MARK US) May Be the Most Brazen Stock Promote of the Year

Wherever we look, we cannot find a real business behind Remark Holdings. The company changes its business description so quickly that even management struggles to explain. That does not stop them from pushing out press releases that make wild claims for fantastic new technologies to come.

SRNE Sorrento Therapeutics (SRNE): Terminal Patient.

We are aware of one incident where SRNE executives asked Bioserv (a subsidiary) to disregard human safety and ship a contaminated product. Two former employees provided us with a detailed account of an incident in April 2017 when a senior member of management directed staff at the Bioserv subsidiary to ship an injectable drug even though the company knew it was contaminated with glass. Two executives quit in protest over the incident and at least one more was fired, apparently for resisting management’s pressure to ship. Fortunately, the company did not ship the contaminated medicine. We believe Sorrento is a zero. Even if you think that Sorrento’s antibody library and other assets have scientific merit, each requires tens of millions of dollars and, more importantly, clear strategic focus to commercialize. Given the perilous condition the company finds itself in financially, it is hard to understand why any potential acquirer would pay more than fire-sale prices.

CCRC Calling CCRC Where’s Our Money?

Bad bid: We think the recent $16 take-private bid was an attempt to prop up share value. Our interviews in China and the company’s own Nasdaq prospectus suggest that Guangzhou Cornerstone, the company that says it will raise the money for the bid, has little capability to come up with the funding required. ‣ Low profits: We think this call center operator is improperly inflating profits by diverting costs into undisclosed related parties. This could drive up optical results while leaving the shareholders’ cupboard bare. CCRC reports 26% gross margins to U.S. investors and just 12% to its Chinese regulators. The company also reports lower revenue in China than it does in its SEC filings. Net profit reported in China in 2017 was just one-third of that reported in the U.S

FANH Who Owns Fanhua? Not the U.S. Shareholders

Fanhua developed a huge commercial real estate project in the founder’s hometown for more than two years without telling investors. Fanhua has been pre-selling residential units there for delivery in 2020—which puts the company on the hook to spend to build out those units. The project was finally mentioned, in passing, on a November 2018 company conference call. ‣ Investors are skeptical that regulators are doing their job in China—how much of this company’s value has been stolen? Based on the evidence, we believe this company is uninvestable

AOS Hot Water

We believe that AOS underwrites UTP’s loans to distributors. Our interviews, credit reports on UTP and AOS China, and other evidence all suggest that the cash the company has in China is being held as security against bad loans to UTP clients. That would mean that a significant portion of AOS’s cash is stuck in China and at risk of being tapped to cover defaults. Yet AOS has disclosed nothing about the cash and never explained why a region accounting for 34% of company revenue needs to hold 84% of company cash.

BGNE BeiGene, Ltd. (BGNE US) No Cure BeiGene May Be Faking 60% of Sales

BeiGene is still pumping and dumping. With a chaotic, over-priced, and ineffectual R&D program for me-too drugs, BeiGene is trying to excite the market and prop up share price by posting high growth in sales of drugs on behalf of Celgene (CELG). But our research indicates that these sales reports are simply a lie

WTC WiseTech (WTC AU, WTCHF US) Part 1: The Wizard of WiseTech

We demonstrate that WiseTech is using uniquely confusing accounting strategies to exaggerate growth and income. In this first report, we take investors through two steps: we show that, even if you accept the revenue and profit figures WiseTech reports, slowing the management spin reveals that growth is significantly exaggerated. Next, we present evidence that we believe shows WiseTech's figures can't be relied upon and that the company's profit may have been overstated by as much as 178% cumulatively since FY 2016.

ENPH Enphase Energy (ENPH US) Stealing from Tomorrow

We think that Enphase is pulling forward sales and stuffing distribution channels in order to make sales appear better than they are. We have analyzed industry reports and estimate that an amazing seven months of inventory is sitting in distribution channels, versus industry norms of about four to six weeks. We believe Enphase is losing market share in solar inverters

LK Luckin Coffee (LK) The Long and Short of It

We are short Luckin and believe that the work of the anonymous short sellers was credible and complementary to our own analysis of the company’s reports.

GDS GDS: Debt Trap.

GDS is a fraud. At least 25% of its revenue is fraudulent. Unlike most Chinese companies, GDS creates the fake revenue by round-tripping its own debt and capex. As GDS’s revenue line grows, so does the amount of debt it needs to raise to support the illusion.

NG NovaGold (NG US) Pipe Dream

For the last 15 years, NovaGold’s management team has systematically misled investors with subjective presentation of information about a deposit so remote and technically challenging that the mine will never be built. During that time, management has been treating this 12-person concept company like an ATM, awarding themselves base salaries that rival those of the CEOs at Newmont and Barrick and total compensation packages comparable with those at Rio and BHP. If the information from the company’s feasibility studies were presented in a more honest light, investors would understand that the Donlin deposit, of which they own 50%, is not feasible to put into production at any gold price.

IDEX Champion of Promotes

Ideanomics (IDEX) (formerly Seven Stars Cloud Group, Inc. and before that WeCast and before that You on Demand Holdings and before that China Broadband) is a zero. The company changes its name and promotional story so frequently that it’s hard to keep up. One thing remains a constant, despite all the press releases, buzzwords and hype: shareholders get wiped out.

STAA STARR Surgical (STAA) Less Than Meets the Eye

We think that STAAR Surgical has overstated sales in China by at least one-third, or $21.6 mln. That would mean that all of the company’s $14 mln in 2019 profit is fake. A single Chinese distributor accounted for 43% of STAAR’s total sales and 71% of its growth in 2019 and over half in Q2 this year. In the 2019 10K, STAAR reports: “One customer, Shanghai Langsheng [sic], our China distributor who sells in to China and Hong Kong, accounted for more than 43% of our consolidated net sales during fiscal 2019.” Unfortunately, the Chinese numbers (which are not audited 2 ) are unreliable.

NAK Pretend and Extend The No-Return Deposit

We believe Northern Dynasty (NAK US, NDM TO) has crafted a money-losing mining plan to achieve government approvals. Since management is bonused on lobbying success instead of for producing minerals, NAK has no reason to care that the new plan is irrational: we think it will lose money, leave investors with a stranded asset, and be canceled anyway if Joe Biden is elected.

ACMR ACM Research (ACMR US) Dirty business

We believe ACM Research (ACMR) is a fraud, over-reporting both revenue and profit. What real profit the company has is apparently being siphoned off to related parties. ACMR faces a cash crunch even with a reported $86 mln in the bank. ACMR is borrowing at high rates of interest, and the company is pushing to IPO substantially all the company assets in Shanghai in order to raise cash. This will significantly dilute U.S. investors.

CBAT CBAK Energy Technology Inc. (CBAT US) The Undead: CBAT Why China BAK Has Zero Value

CBAK Energy Technology Inc. (CBAT) represents the barely re-animated corpse of CBAK, a Chinese reverse merger that lost all its manufacturing assets to default in 2014.1 In 2015-16, CBAT raised $113 mln from investors to build new factories—and, we will show, appears to have simply taken a lot of that cash.

BTBT Bit Digital, Inc. (BTBT): Criminals and Fugitives.

With key executives in jail or on the lam for having bilked Chinese investors out of $42 mln in a fraudulent P2P business, Bit Digital (BTBT) has moved on to a fake crypto currency business. We will show that the assets probably do not exist, and the business is designed to steal funds from investors.

NEA Nearmap Ltd. (NEA AX) Afraid to Admit Failure

Nearmap Ltd. (NEA AX) repeatedly assures investors it deserves a heady share price because of high growth and coming profits in the U.S. market. Actually, the company is laying off sales staff and offering discounts in a panicked attempt to improve margins, kneecapping its efforts to grow. Nearmap is apparently trying to hide its U.S. failure with accounting tricks to pull forward revenue. Without that seemingly aggressive revenue recognition, we believe revenue growth in the U.S was less than half what was reported.

BTCM BTCM: It Keeps Coming Back Now It's Trying the Crypto-Hoax Space

‣ BTCM has been losing money since 2015, a year after its IPO. We think that’s intentional. ‣ We’ll show that the crypto mining plan is end-to-end hype. ‣ We found that BTCM overstated by 650% the revenue of the offshore lottery business it bought then falsely blamed a regulatory change for plummeting income. ‣ The company has been through five lines of business and three auditors since its core business was banned in 2015. Crypto mining is the latest promote. ‣ BTCM is known in China for running low-level scams and Ponzis. Unfortunately, a lot of U.S. investors have not yet caught on to the grift.

CDXC Unhealthy A Full Dose of Promotion

After months of examining ChromaDex (CDXC), we have come to the conclusion that the company is pure hype, dished up by an Oceans 11 of stock promoters. CDXC promotes its single product, a health supplement, with iterative press releases that boost share price long enough for insider sales before the vaunted advantages contained in those press releases quietly disappear.

MARA Marathon: Mining Investor Credulity

Mining is the last frontier of crypto fraud. We’ve had major frauds committed by the exchanges, the crypto banks, liquidity pools, and more. There was the mining fraud Ebang (EBON) that Hindenburg exposed, and now we have a company with all of 25 people that claims to have bought 240,000 miners but somehow has deployed less than one-third of them.

YMM Full Truck Alliance (YMM) A Round Trip for Investors?

Our report has five sections that we believe are powerful on their own. Together, we feel they are overwhelming, and the company looks significantly over-valued. 1. Interviews allege round tripping 2. Accounting and other disclosures effectively corroborate that the numbers are too high, which might be suggestive of round tripping. 3. Questionable acquisitions: on the balance sheet side, acquisitions have been made and written off shortly afterwards. 4. Fundamental business deterioration: We think the VAT rebate will end. There are also a lot of insider sales and weakening cash flows 5. Other major risks include the undercapitalized loan business, regulatory problems, and weak internal controls

INS Intelligent Systems Corp: Material Undisclosed Related Party Transactions Cast Doubt on the Integrity of Financial Statements

We believe that Intelligent Systems Corp. (INS) has its employees set up or take control of undisclosed shell companies in Asia, who then partake in undisclosed related party transactions with INS intended to either round-trip revenue back to INS or siphon money out of the company. We believe that materia presented in this report undisclosed related party transactions cast doubt on the integrity of INS’s financial statements. Accordingly, we assign INS a price target of $5.

NBEV NBEV Shareholders got Duped in the Morinda Transaction

We believe that Morinda’s China business is in jeopardy of being totally shut down, supporting our conclusion that any growth Morinda is claiming it has experienced in China, or that NBEV is expecting to realize from China is in the rear-view mirror and irrelevant. Our research combined with our on-the-ground research proves that Morinda is conducting illegal MLM operations in the majority of China provinces/cities that it operates in. Specifically, it is doing business in regions where it does not have a direct selling license to operate in.

TRUL Trulieve Cannabis Corp: Why we believe the Company is a Fraud

Our on the ground due diligence including drone footage suggest that the majority of the company’s cultivation space comes from hoop houses that produce low quality output that is prone to infestation and weather damage.We found extensive ties between Trulieve and ongoing FBI investigations into corruption in North Florida.Trulieve’s initial license approval stinks of corruption and involved multipleOur on the ground due diligence including drone footage suggest that the majority of the company’s cultivation space comes from hoop houses that produce low quality output that is prone to infestation and weather damage. We found extensive ties between Trulieve and ongoing FBI investigations into corruption in North Florida. Trulieve’s initial license approval stinks of corruption and involved multiple undisclosed conflicts of interest. undisclosed conflicts of interest.

WUBA We believe that 58.com (WUBA) is a House of Cards with Little Economic Substance

• Our extensive due diligence, accounting analysis, and review of Chinese SAIC filings suggests to us that WUBA is an accounting house of cards with little economic substance. • We believe that WUBA has failed to disclose that its biggest acquisition Ganji, acquired for $2.8bn, has seen its revenue plummet by over 95% since the acquisition by WUBA. • Our fundamental analysis of WUBA shows that the company’s core business is facing numerous headwinds, including an unfavorable environment for housing and job market. These issues are only emphasized by the recent health crisis in China. • While WUBA raises money from US shareholders on the back of what we believe to be fraudulent financials, insiders at the company are getting rich.

GOTU Brushed Student Counts and Cooked Books: Why We Believe GSX Techedu is the Worst Publicly Traded Education Company

GSX Techedu Inc. (NYSE: GSX) (“GSX Techedu” or “GSX”) is portrayed as a rising star in China’s online education space, having seen its stock more than triple since its NYSE IPO in June 2019. • GSX reports financials to the SEC that we believe are simply too good to be true. Our extensive research including review of PRC Credit Reports, SAIC filings, and web analysis indicate to us that GSX’s success is actually based on a fraudulent scheme.

IIPR Is Innovative Industrial Properties, Inc. (NYSE:IIPR) the WeWork of Cannabis? We think it’s Worse!

● IIPR is a publicly traded REIT focused on cannabis, and we are highly skeptical of the company and its management. ● We visited in person dozens of properties, interviewed neighbors, the county clerks, and reviewed related leases. Our findings are shocking: We believe IIPR has accumulated a highly toxic portfolio of low-quality assets. ● In our opinion IIPR either fails to do basic due diligence on its counterparts or is defrauding investors. ●Our independent analysis concludes that IIPR’s value per share is even under optimistic assumptions no more than $22.29.

NISN We Believe Hebron Technology Co., Ltd. (HEBT) is an Insider Enrichment Scheme without Economic Basis

• We believe HEBT is the quintessential example why we need tighter disclosure and auditing regulations for US listed Chinese companies. We believe HEBT has engaged in egregious wrongdoings that should result in immediate delisting. • HEBT’s stock price has skyrocketed on the back of recent private placements at ever higher prices. These are touted as confirmation of the company, because outside institutional investors are willing to buy at a substantial premium to market price. We discovered that the investors seem to be in fact undisclosed related parties, and we doubt the shares were even paid for! It seems this is a scheme designed to portray real interest in the stock and push the price artificially higher.

LX We Believe LexinFintech Holdings Ltd. (NASDAQ: LX) is a Leverage Time Bomb About to Explode

• LX operates a high-interest rate online consumer lending platform in China. We believe LX’s business model is deeply flawed and set to collapse. Our target price is ZERO. • Giant misstatements in the past and weakness in financial reporting we uncover in this report paint the picture of a company whose financials can simply not be trusted. • Our review of basic web traffic analysis leads us to question if the purported volume by LX is even real in the first place. • Despite LX management touting its Tencent background, major shareholders including JD.com are selling off, showing a lack of confidence in LX’s future. • Our valuation prices in the severe risks hidden from investors. Upon adjustments, we believe the company should have seen an equity decrease of RMB 1.85B. Ultimately, we believe the company is not viable under new Chinese regulations.

CELH Why We Don’t Trust Celsius Holdings Inc. (Nasdaq: CELH) Portrayed Growth

Given the risks noted in this report, we believe investors should exercise caution when thinking about the growth that (judging by market valuation) is assumed to be a foregone conclusion. Combine this with the apparent fraudulent track record of key individuals and an auditor who seems ill-equipped to detect fraud, and you have yourself a perfect set up for a bad awakening. We see the stock declining to a price target of $ and potentially much lower.

SPI SPI Energy Co., Ltd (Nasdaq: SPI): The Perpetual Pump and Dump – Electric Vehicles Will Be No Different

- We believe SPI is an egregious pump and dump company. The company’s stock has had a date with almost all the hottest trends in the recent two years, including Cryptocurrency, CBD, and now Electric Vehicles. - The stock tells a repetitive story of pumping the stock on news of hot strategic establishment, followed by aggressive PR campaigns and ultimately a failing value proposition.

DOYU DOYU – Massive Risk with Suspected Online Gambling Business and Industry-Wide Reform

• We believe DOYU has been involved with illegal online gambling on their platform. Our research indicates that not only is DOYU hosting these illegal activities, but they are actively encouraging their users to gamble on their platform to boost revenue • Recent policy announcements indicate a more stringent regulatory environment that is cracking down on online gambling, order brushing and faking operat-ing numbers. We believe the full scale of the policy reform will be massive • MOMO, another online streaming platform based in China, recently presented terrible financial performance in light of “structural reform”. We believe this is an indicator of what is to come to DOYU

FIZZ We Still Call a Spade a Spade: Why We Believe National Beverage Corp (FIZZ) Might be a Better Short Than Ever

- The recent frenzy in high short interest stocks, most notably GameStop and AMC, has lifted several other stocks and created an attractive short opportunity in FIZZ. - We heard rumors that brokers are circulating positive notes about FIZZ to hedge funds. We believe a lot of the recent buyers do not really understand what they own. - The problems at FIZZ start with horrifc corporate governance, Chairman and CEO Nick Caporella has been on the board for 36 years, his son Joseph for 34. No one new has joined the board in 11 years, and no one is under 60. - The integrity issues at the company show on many fronts like misleading marketing, alleged dealings with undisclosed related parties und undisclosed insider enrichment. Most shocking to us are sexual harassment allegations against FIZZ’s 82-year-old Chairman.

WELL We believe Well Health Technologies is a Toxic Roll-Up

•We believe WELL’s largest ever acquisition, CRH Medical, is highly problematic refecting that WELL hype train is over. Red fags indicate a high likelihood of confict of interest and due diligence failures. Bottom line – CRH appears to be a toxic deal that WELL grossly overpaid for; if this is the best they can buy, shareholders are in trouble. • We uncover the reality of the economic impact of CRH’s key customer “renewal” and it’s not pretty. • It appears WELL has omitted crucial information on many recent acquisitions, including CRH. Acquisitions are marketed as synergistic, and fnancially solid, but evidence uncovered suggests otherwise. • WELL paid a 300% premium for Adracare, a company emerging from bankruptcy with a history of cooked fnancials. • WELL purchased a “proclaimed telehealth” company Circle Medical. However, we believe this is far from reality; that's why Circle’s shareholders cashed out with the WELL deal

TSP L4 Autonomous Truck Driving will not be so simple for TuSimple Holdings Inc. (NASDAQ: TSP) Why we believe the Company is All Smoke and Mirrors

- Despite the company’s attempt to distance itself from China origins, the regulatory uncertainty revolving around Chinese companies listed abroad puts huge headwind on the company’s already uncertain future. - We conclude that TSP is nothing but an empty box that was nicely packaged and irresponsibly dumped on US investors. We see the stock losing up to 50% within a short to medium timeframe once the hype is over.

PKK Peak Fintech Group Inc (NASDAQ: TNT; CSE: PKK): Strong Delisting Candidate on Millions Misappropriated

- Peak Fintech Group, Inc. (NASDAQ: TNT; CSE: PKK) is a Canadian parent to subsidiaries claiming to revolutionize China’s nancial system. - Promotion-driven excitement for PKK’s alleged rampant revenue growth has led a >1,000% rise in its stock during 2021 culminating with a NASDAQ uplisting in early September. - The uplisting has been less than smooth sailing. It took just 11 days for the stock to be halted for ling deciencies and we believe it is destined for delisting. - PKK’s evolution is questionable at best. The company pivoted from failed, wannabe “Find My iPhone” software, to revenue-less IT services, to a fully impaired e-commerce platform before becoming a “hub” for commercial lending in China.

MP MP Materials Corp. (NYSE:MP): Rare Earth Shenanigans in Chamath Backed Company Will Likely Cost Investors Dearly

Rare earth mining company MP Materials Corp came public on the NYSE in November 2020 through a SPAC reverse merger backed by “SPAC King” Chamath Palihapitiya. The company was able to sell itself to investors touting the fact that MP is the biggest rare earth producer in the western world and the only feasible competitor to Chinese producers. In reality, we believe that this is nothing more than a smoke and mirrors show. We found that Shenghe, a related party that accounts for 99% of MP’s revenue, and a significant shareholder, can be traced back to the Chinese central government. The projections that MP puts forth seem completely unattainable, and the company needs to incur capital expenditures that might lead it back into bankruptcy.

SOL We believe ReneSola is a Fraudulent Company; Most Projects Never Existed

ReneSola (NASDAQ: SOL) is a pure downstream player in the solar industry. The company is focused on developing and operating solar projects. The company originated in China and went public in 2008 on NASDAQ, after it was already previously listed on the London AIM exchange. Our on the ground due diligence, filings review, and communications with local municipalities in Europe indicate that SOL has been vastly misrepresenting its project development pipeline. We believe SOL is a fraudulent company that drastically overrepresents its project pipeline to access the US capital markets. SOL is led by what we believe to be a fraudulent team whose legal difficulties will ultimately also cause problems for SOL public shareholders. We see over 40% downside from current prices.

PLTK We Believe Playtika Holding Corp. (NASDAQ: PLTK) Is Another Piggy Bank For Chinese Insiders That Was Recklessly Dumped On Public Investors

Playtika Holding Corp (NASDAQ: PLTK) is an online gaming company that went public on the NASDAQ in January 2021. Our research indicates that the company was recklessly stripped of its cash and loaded with debt just prior to its initial public offering. PLTK is basically the only major mobile gaming company with a huge debt balance. we believe PLTK’s short-termism comes at the expense of lasting shareholder and business value. Looming regulatory risks and an aggressive monetization strategy make the business unsustainable. We consider PLTK’s insiders’ debt-financed dividend payment and plans to sell as indicative of their intent to extrac.

EMO Infamous Stock Promoter Backed Emerita Resources (TSXV: EMO): Bait-and-Switch Track Record And Rampant Misrepresentation

- EMO is a Stan Bharti related junior mining company. The company’s stock has risen over 2000% over the last year, from CAD 0.20 to a high of CAD 4.14/sh. - Stan Bharti is in our view an infamous stock promoter involved in many notorious firms including Brazilian Potash, Flora Growth LLC, that on average declined by over 80%.

NIO We Believe NIO Plays Valeant-esque Accounting Games to Inflate Revenue and Boost Net Income Margins to Meet Targets

Today, we reveal what we consider an audacious scheme by NYSE-listed NIO. Reminiscent of the Philidor-Valeant relationship, NIO is likely using an unconsolidated related party to exaggerate revenue and profitability. Presumably, with these stellar operating results in mind, retail investors have bid NIO’s shares up >450% since 2020, making it one of China’s most valuable EV companies. Allow us to introduce you to Wuhan Weineng (“Weineng”), the convenient difference-maker helping NIO exceed lofty growth and profitability estimates on The Street. Despite being formed by NIO and a consortium of investors in late 2020, this unconsolidated related party has already generated billions in revenue for NIO. While this rapid growth is impressive on the surface, our investigation has found Weineng might be to NIO what Philidor was to Valeant. Just as Philidor aided Valeant in habitually making numbers, NIO has curiously exceeded estimates since establishing Weineng.

ZTO ZTO Express Inc. (NYSE: ZTO): China’s “Best-in-Class” Logistics Company is Really “Best in Show”

We Believe Financials are Fake and Insiders are Stealing from the Company. It is our view that ZTO’s apparently superior margins are, in fact, just the result of its potentially falsified financial statements. We believe ZTO has underreported revenue and costs to engineer these standout results. Our report highlights corroborating evidence including incessant capital raising, accounting inconsistencies, and numerous conflicts of interest which contradict ZTO’s exceptional margins.

GWH Caught Red-Handed: We Present Evidence that ESS Tech Inc.’s Biggest Customer is Really an Undisclosed Related Party Without Operations

ESS Tech Inc. (“ESS”, NYSE: GWH) develops and produces utility-scale batteries for long-duration storage of electricity employing a “simple yet revolutionary technology: iron, salt and water” The market for long-duration battery storage is highly competitive and technically challenging. We argue ESS’s claims about its technology are overstated and targeted at creating investor hype for laypeople regarding the field of battery engineering.

DOS Jehoshaphat Research is Short Amdocs Ltd. (DOX)

VIEW Jehoshaphat Research is Short View, Inc. (VIEW)

AHCO Jehoshaphat Research is Short AdaptHealth Corp. (AHCO)

MXL Jehoshaphat Research is Short MaxLinear Inc. (MXL)

BWXT Jehoshaphat Research is Short BWX Technologies, Inc. (BWXT)

ARMC Jehoshaphat Research is Short Ameresco (AMRC)

HASI Jehoshaphat Research is short Hannon Armstrong (HASI)

ARRY Jehoshaphat Research is Short Array Technologies (ARRY)

669.HK Jehoshaphat Research is Short Techtronic Industries Ltd. (669 HK)

We’re short the securities of Techtronic (669 HK, or “TTI”), a power tools company that’s been inflating its profits dramatically for over a decade with manipulative accounting. A broad “toolbox” of accounting games has enabled TTI to engineer a profit margin trendline so perfect, it does not otherwise exist on Earth. Of every single public company over $1bn revenue in the entire world, TTI is the only one whose gross margin has gone up every half-year, sequentially, for ten years straight

PGNY Jehoshaphat Research is Short Progyny (PGNY)

We are short shares of Progyny (PGNY), a company we believe is deceiving the investor community via its financial reporting practices. These practices rely on complex accounting that PGNY appears to have been exploiting for years. We believe that PGNY recently has taken its aggression to a brazen level by secretively changing important accounting policies that materially inflate profits. We calculate that PGNY is actually unprofitable, but masks this problem with accounting games.

HROW Harrow Health (HROW): Honig-Tied Reverse Merger Just Promoted a Felon to the C-Suite

ATRC AtriCure (ATRC): Addressing the Sell-Side Response

PUMP ProPetro Holding Corp (PUMP): Friends & Family First at this Permian Cesspool

CYDY CytoDyn (CYDY): Where the Drugs are as Convincing as the Dreamcatchers

OTRK Catasys (CATS): Where are the Customers’ Savings? Wait, where are the Customers?

VBIV VBI Vaccines Inc (VBIV): If at First You Don’t Succeed, Try a COVID-19 Vaccine

BLNK Blink Charging Co. (BLNK): You Won’t Miss It

KIDS OrthoPediatrics Corp. (KIDS): Even Channel Stuffing Can't Save This Company

SOS SOS Ltd (SOS): Nothing to Save Here

ATER Aterian (ATER): Bought from Felons & Fraudsters, Sold to You

LMFD LifeMD Inc. (LFMD): Redwood Redux at RexMD

CLSK CleanSpark, Inc. (CLSK) - Back to the Trash Can

DATS DatChat, Inc (DATS): By Scammers, For Scammers

AMTX Aemetis, Inc. (AMTX): Pouring Fuel on a Dumpster Fire

CORZ Core Scientific, Inc. (CORZ): Rigged Deals

PLL Piedmont Lithium (PLL): A "Made in America" Promotion

VERU Veru Inc (VERU): Trials and Errors

NRGV Energy Vault (NRGV): Gravitational Pull to Zero

XMTR Xometry, Inc. (XMTR): the Pets.com of Manufacturing

We are short Xometry, Inc. (“Xometry”, “XMTR”, “the Company), a 2021 IPO and holdover from the era of VC fueled delusions of grandeur. We think Xometry’s unviable business case is unraveling, and we expect shares to trade lower as the Company’s manufactured narratives crumble.

TMCI Treace Medical Concepts Inc (NASDAQ:TMCI): Screwed

We are short Treace Medical Concepts Inc (“TMCI”, “Treace”, “the Company”). Treace makes itself out to be an innovative MedTech business “driving a fundamental shift in the surgical treatment of Hallux Valgus” (i.e., bunions) through its triplane Lapidus fusion (i.e., “Lapiplasty”) kits. Our view is that Treace’s primary innovation has not been in any sort of medical advancements, but in aggressive reimbursement practices and deceptive DTC marketing. We view these business drivers as problematic and self-defeating, as insurers appear to have begun placing Lapiplasty procedure reimbursements under scrutiny while customer complaints about misleading claims from Treace are mounting.

NB2 RESEARCH REPORT: NORTHERN DATA AG (XTRA: NB2)

SEV RESEARCH REPORT: SONO GROUP N.V. (NASDAQ: SEV)

BRP BRP GROUP

PVBC RESEARCH REPORT: PROVIDENT BANCORP. (NASDAQ: PVBC)

NINGI Research is short Provident Bancorp, Inc. (NASDAQ: PVBC), because after recent revelations regarding losses due to crypto-backed loans, we think the bank is riddled with nepotism. In our opinion, the CEO failed at risk management and leadership due to seemingly personal relationships. The board of directors failed at its supervisory duties and the public’s trust in the bank deteriorated. We expect further revelations and regulatory actions in the coming weeks.

CRMD CorMedix: Infected With Hype, Valuation Swollen

ACB Aurora Cannabis: Death Spiral Financing In Disguise, Longs Beware

NYMX Nymox Pharmaceutical: Employee Resume Substantiates Concerns

KERN Akerna Corp: Undisclosed Probable Contract Cancellation Coupled with Low Cash Balance Equals Near-Term Headline Risk

ZYXI Zynex: Deteriorating Fundamentals and Signs of Reimbursement Pressure

FCEL FuelCell Energy: Material Undisclosed Project Award Losses, 70%+ Downside

VERI Veritone: Don’t Believe the Hype

MVMD Mountain Valley MD: Aggressive Stock Promotion and Hollow Science, 100% Downside

CMC Cielo Waste Solutions: Related Party JVs Mask Financial Vulnerability

BYSI BeyondSpring: Poor Trial Conduct and Lack of Transparency Creates Substantial Downside Risk

UNH Zynex: Turnaround Nears Inevitable End – Largest Payor Cuts TENS Reimbursement, May Eliminate Earnings

ZEN Zentek: Late-Stage Bubble to Pop on Misjudged Demand and Alleged Intellectual Property Theft

ONDS Ondas Holdings: High Risk of Derailment – Esoteric Regulatory Language Shields Poor Execution

IBAT International Battery Metals: Overinflated and Precariously Underfunded

We are short International Battery Metals (CSE:IBAT), a Canada-based developer of lithium extraction technology led by a CEO whose two previous mineral extraction ventures wiped out shareholders. IBAT shares have been swept higher by glowing projections from management and widespread enthusiasm for EV-associated battery metals: in the last two years IBAT’s market capitalization is up 110x to $450m (all figures in CAD), gratuitous considering IBAT has yet to show that it’s mobile direct lithium extraction (DLE) technology works at pilot scale.

AR4 Aurelius No Equity Opportunities

KRZ Kerry’s suspect acquisition spend

2200 Hosa International Ltd. (HKEX: 2200)

Please go to Detail Link to view the report

8207 Chong Sing (HKEX: 8207)

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1044 Hengan (HKEX: 1044)

AHG Short Hexindai (Nasdaq: HX)

CGN Short Best World (BB: BEST _ SGX:CGN)

3998 Short Bosideng (HKEx: 3998)

RFF Short Rural Funds (ASX: RFF)

EVER Short Everquote (Nasdaq: EVER)

JKS JinkoSolar, Inc.

PETS Short Pets At Home (London: PETS)

HTHT Short Huazhu (Nasdaq_HTHT)(HKEX: 1179)

HYLN Short Hyliion (NYSE: HYLN)

3836 Short China Harmony Auto (HKEX: 3836)

UAVS Short AgEagle Aerial Systems (UAVS) - February 18, 2021

FUV Short Arcimoto (FUV)

TMC SHORT TMC the metals co (Nasdaq: TMC)

GWH SHORT ESS TECH INC. (NYSE: GWH)

AGFY SHORT Agrify Corp. (Nasdaq: AGFY)

MP SHORT MP MATERIALS ($MP)

GGR SHORT GOGORO (Nasdaq: GGR)

ATEC SHORT ALPHATEC (NASDAQ: ATEC)

HROW HARROW HEALTH – $HROW – LATEST IDEA – FEBRUARY 22, 2023

Harrow burns cash from operations and relies on external financing for survival. We think Harrow did not disclose to investors the existence of a DOJ investigation because it would have compromised Harrow’s ability to raise capital. With significant liabilities managed by bad actors willing to enrich themselves at the expense of minority Harrow shareholders, we are short Harrow and think its stock is going lower.